Yuxin CHEN, KIVILCIM DÖĞERLİOĞLU DEMİR, Özge TURUT, EZGİ AKPINAR UYSAL

Rakibi Caydıracak Pazarlama Stratejileri ve Yönetici Teşvik Programları: Bilişsel Hiyerarşi Bazlı Yeni Bakış Açısı

Üst düzey yöneticilere sağlanan menfaatlerin önemli bir unsuru olan hisse teşvik ödülleri ülkemizde de yaygınlaşmaya başlamıştır. Ancak, literatürde hisse teşvik ödüllerinin yöneticiyi doğru motive edeceği ve şirket için doğru stratejik kararlar vermesini sağlayacağına dair net bir görüş bulunmamaktadır. Literatürde gösterilmiştir ki, yöneticiler stratejik düşünme yetenekleri açısından farklılık göstermektedirler ve bu yüzden rakip firmaların düşünce ve hareketlerini standart oyun teorisinin öngördüğü şekilde doğru tahmin edemeyebilirler. Yöneticilerin stratejik düşünme kabiliyetlerinde heterojen yapıyı ve hisse teşvik ödüllerinin yaygın bir şekilde kullanıldığını göz önüne alarak, bu makalede hangi koşullar altında şirketlerin hisse teşvik ödüllerini kullanmalarının doğru olacağı araştırılmaktadır. Bunun için şirketin yöneticisinin hareketlerini doğrudan kontrol edemediği durumlarda, yöneticiye sağlayacağı finansal teşvikle yöneticinin rakiplerin piyasaya girmesini caydıracak pazarlama stratejileri geliştirmesini sağlaması konusu seçilmiştir. Araştırmalar Bilişsel Hiyerarşi modelini baz alarak geliştirilen matematiksel modelle yapılmıştır. Sonuçlara göre, teşvik olarak hisse teşvik ödülleri yönetici ve rakip firma tamamen stratejikse ya da yönetici naif ancak rakip değilse verilmelidir. Eğer rakip firma naifse kâr bazlı prim verilmelidir

Marketing Strategies for Entry Deterrence and Managerial Compensation: A New Perspective Based on Cognitive Hierarchy

Firms in Turkey have started to practice giving stock options as part of managers compensation. However, in the literature it is not clear that giving stock options would motivate managers to make the right strategic decisions. It is well documented that managers vary in their ability of thinking strategically, and they may not be able to correctly conjecture the actions and beliefs of competitors as assumed in the standard game theory. Given this heterogeneity in managers’ strategic thinking capability and the importance of managerial compensation, it is investigated when it is profitable to compensate managers by giving stock options. The context is chosen in which firms do not have the access to control managers directly, but can motivate them to develop the right marketing strategies to deter entry. Based on Cognitive Hierarchy model stock options are found that they should be used only if both the manager and the rival are strategic or the manager is naive, but not the rival.

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