Büyüme Fırsatları Bağlamında Kaldıraç, Kar Payı, Sahiplik Yoğunlaşması ve Firma Değeri İlişkisi

Bu çalışmada kaldıraç, kar payı, sahiplik yoğunlaşması ve firma değeri ilişkisinin büyüme fırsatlarına göre farklılaşıp farklılaşmadığı araştırılmıştır. 2010-2020 yılları arasında Borsa İstanbul 100 endeksine kayıtlı olan belirli sayıdaki firma verileri ile gerçekleştirilen panel veri analizi sonuçları kaldıraç ve kar paylarının firma değerini pozitif yönde etkilediğini ve elde edilen sonuçların özellikle düşük büyüme fırsatlarına sahip firmalarda anlamlı olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Elde edilen sonuçlar aşırı yatırım problemine dayanan temsilcilik teorisi ile uyumlu olup, borç ve kar paylarının yönetimi disipline edici rolü olduğu görüşüne destek vermektedir. Ancak çalışmada eksik yatırım görüşüne ilişkin bir bulguya rastlanmamıştır. Sahiplik yoğunlaşmasına ilişkin elde edilen bulgular ise her iki grupta da sahiplik yoğunlaşması firma değeri ilişkisinin doğrusal olmadığını; ancak ilişki yönünün gruplar arasında farklılık gösterdiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

The Relationship Between Leverage, Dividend, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Value in the Context of Growth Opportunities

This study investigates whether the effect of leverage, dividends, ownership concentration on firm value differs among the firms with high and low growth opportunities. A number of firms that are listed on Borsa Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 Indices over the 2010-2020 period are analyzed using panel data analysis. The overall results show that leverage and dividends positively impact firm value, and the results are found to be significant in the group of firms with low growth opportunities. The findings are in parallel with the agency theory of overinvestment and support the disciplining role of debt and dividends in management activities. However, the study can not reach any findings related overinvestment view. The ownership concentration and firm value have a nonlinear relationship in both groups, but the direction of the relationship differs among them.

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Üçüncü Sektör Sosyal Ekonomi-Cover
  • ISSN: 2148-1237
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 4 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 1941
  • Yayıncı: Türk Kooperatifçilik Kurumu