İNDİRİMCİ ÇÖZÜMLEMEDE DOĞRULUĞUN GÖRÜNÜŞLERİ

Tabiatı itibariyla metafizik veya semantik, karakteri itibariyla da formel veya enformel olsun, doğruluk hakkındaki felsefi kuramlaştırma ana verilerini sıradan veya tabii doğruluk konuşmasından, yani sıradan veya tabii dil gövdesinin, doğruluk terimlerini veya ifadelerini ve doğruluk atfı yapılarını kullanan kısmından toplar. Bu yazı, doğruluğun felsefi araştırmasında, daha belirli olarak da indirimci yaklaşımda merkezi konumda bulunan doğruluk konuşması unsurunun doğruluk yüklemi veya daha uygun bir ifadeyle doğruluk yüklemeli biçim olduğunu resimleme girişiminde bulunmaktadır. Buna yönelik olarak, öncelikle

APPEARANCES OF TRUTH IN THE DEFLATIONARY ANALYSIs

Philosophical theorizing about truth, whether it be metaphysical or semantic in nature, formal or informal in character, collects its primary data from ordinary/natural truth discourse, i.e. that part of ordinary/natural corpus of language which recruits alethic terminology and alethic ascription structures. This paper attempts to illustrate the fact that it is the truth predicate, or more properly, the truth-predicative form as a whole in that discourse, that lies at the center of the philosophical investigation of, and in particular, of the deflationary approach to, truth. To that effect, it gives a first exhibition of the significance of the difference between the two basic logical appearances of truth in ordinary discourse, namely, the (so-called) truth operator purportedly expressing some sort of identity truth-function and the truth predicate, in terms of the formulation of the liar paradox; then it shows how these appearances differ from each other from the perspective of grammatical generalization/quantification with respect to the grammatical position of sentence. The paper concludes, through a brief discussion of the Ramseian case (to which the modern deflationary approach can safely be traced back), by underlining the fact that the phenomenon of deflated truth had better be characterized as irredundant transparency in opposition to simple redundancy.

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