Bağımsız maliye politikası kurulu uygulanabilir mi?

Maliye politikasının hükümetlerin siyasi çıkarları doğrultusunda kullanılması, mali disiplinin bozulması ve son dönemlerde sıklıkla uygulanmaya başlanılan mali kurallar para politikasına benzer şekilde maliye politikasının da bağımsız yetkili bir kurula devredilebileceği fikrini gündeme getirmiştir. Bu düşüncenin temelinde merkez bankasının bağımsızlık kazanmakla birlikte özellikle enflasyon konusunda elde etmiş olduğu başarının, mali disiplin konusunda maliye politikası açısından da geçerli olacağı yani aynı başarının maliye politikasını bu politikayı yürütmekle görevli bağımsız bir kurula devretmekle de sağlanabileceği fikri yer almaktadır. Bu çalışma, maliye politikasının bağımsız bir maliye politikası kuruluna devredilip devredilemeyeceği fikrini tartışmak amacıyla hazırlanmıştır. Bu amaçla hazırlanan çalışmada, maliye politikası kurulu fikrine ilişkin yapılan teorik çalışmalar değerlendirilmiş ve bağımsız bir maliye politikası kurulu önerisi getirilmiştir.

Is an independent fiscal policy committee feasible?

Using the fiscal policy in line with the political interests of governments, the corruption of fiscal discipline and the fiscal rules which started to be frequently used in recent years have brought up the idea that the fiscal policy can be delegated to an independent committee in a similar way to the monetary policy. On the basis of this idea, there is the success of the central bank which achieved especially on inflation along with gaining its independence. In a similar way, the same success can be gained with the delegation of the fiscal policy to an independent committee through maintaining the fiscal discipline. This study is conducted to discuss the idea of whether transferring the fiscal policy to an independent fiscal policy committee or not. For this purpose, in this study, the theoretical studies related to fiscal policy committees have been evaluated and as a result an independent fiscal policy committee has been recommended.

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