ULUSÜSTÜ AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KURUMLARI ARASINDAKİ GÜÇ DENGESİ: İŞBİRLİĞİ Mİ, REKABET Mİ?

Sıklıkla dünya üzerindeki en ileri bölgesel bütünleşme deneyimi olarak anılan Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) temelinde üye devletlerden devredilen yetkiler yer almaktadır. AB düzeyinde bu yetkiler çoğunlukla hükümetlerarası ve ulusüstü özellikteki AB kurumları eliyle kullanılmaktadır. Üye devletler bütünleşmenin değişen ihtiyaçlarını göz önünde bulundurarak zaman içinde AB kurumlarına daha fazla yetki devrinde bulunmuştur. Bu durum AB kurumlarıyla üye devletler arasındaki ilişkilerin yeniden tanımlanmasını beraberinde getirdiği gibi kurumlar arası güç dağılımını da etkileyerek kurumlar arası ilişkilerin yeniden tanımlanmasına neden olmaktadır. Çalışma kapsamında ulusüstü AB kurumları olan Avrupa Komisyonu, Avrupa Parlamentosu ve Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı (ABAD) arasındaki güç dengesi konusu ele alınmıştır. Çalışmada aynı zamanda ulusüstü AB kurumları arasındaki ilişkilerin işbirlikçi mi rekabetçi mi olduğuna da değinilmiştir. Ele alınan ulusüstü AB kurumları arasındaki ilişki ikili kombinasyonlar halinde değerlendirilmiştir

THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THE SUPRANATIONAL EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

The powers transferred by the member states lie at the root of the European Union (EU), which has been frequently labelled as the most advanced form of integration in the world. The powers transferred have been mostly used by the intergovernmental and supranational institutions at the EU level. By considering the changing needs of the integration, the EU institutions were empowered by the member states. This has affected the power distribution between the EU institutions and member states by leading the dominance of a new rationale in their relations, as well as the power balance between the EU institutions has shifted as a result. This study elaborates on the power balance among the three supranational EU institutions, namely European Commission, European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The study also provided an analysis about the nature of the relations between these supranational institutions, especially by defining these relations either as cooperative or competitive. The relations between the mentioned EU institutions are dealt with in the form of two-fold combinations in the study

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