Nejla Adanur AKLAN, Hülya AKAY KANALCI, Feridun YILMAZ

Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası'nın Bağımsızlığı: Politik İktisat Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme

Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı, yirmi yılı aşkın süredir para politikası tartışmalarının en merkezi kavramlarından birisi haline gelmiştir. Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ile fiyat istikrarı arasında güçlü bir pozitif ilişkinin olduğu yaygın olarak öne sürülmektedir. Bu çerçevede merkez bankası bağımsızlığı, enflasyon problemini aşmada dışsal ve ye- terli bir unsur olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Oysa enflasyon ve diğer iktisadi problem- ler kurumsal ve politik bir çevre içerisinde gömülüdür. Örneğin Hayo (1998) merkez bankası bağımsızlığının düşük enflasyonu açıklamada tek başına yeterli olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Düşük enflasyon, fiyat istikrarı yönünde kamuoyunun sergilediği ira- de ile de çok yakından ilişkilidir. Kamuoyunun tercih ve davranışları ülkenin ekono- mi kültürünün de bir parçasıdır. Dolayısıyla ülkenin kurumsal ve tarihsel tecrübesin- den etkilenen ekonomi kültürü (Phelps 2011), bir ekonominin enflasyon performansı- nı açıklamada yardımcı bir araç olarak değerlendirilebilir. Türkiye ekonomisi 1980li ve 1990lı yıllar boyunca kronik enflasyon (çift haneli enflasyon) tecrübesi yaşamış- tır. 2001 finansal krizinden sonra, Türkiyede güçlü ekonomiye geçiş programı uygu- lanmış ve TCMB aynı yıl bağımsız hale getirilmiştir. Bağımsızlık sonrası yıllarda enf- lasyon tek haneli rakamlara inmiştir. Bu makalede merkez bankası bağımsızlığının Türkiye ekonomisinin düşük enflasyon tecrübesini açıklamada gerekli ama yeterli ol- madığı öne sürülmektedir. Düşük enflasyon, Türkiye ekonomisinde merkez bankası bağımsızlığının yanında ekonomi kültürünün de dönüşmesiyle daha iyi açıklanabile- cek bir olgudur. Makale politik iktisat perspektifinden, Türkiye ekonomisinin enflasyon probleminin arkasında yatan ekonomi kültürü ile ilgili faktörleri açıklama çabasındadır.

Central Bank Independence in Turkey: A Political Economy Approach

Central bank independence (CBI) has become one of the central concepts in mone- tary issues for two decades. It is commonly argued that there is a strong positive re- lationship between CBI and price stability. CBI is considered as exogeneous and suf- ficient to overcome an inflation problem. However inflation and the other economic problems are embedded in institutional and political environment. Hayo (1998) argu- es that CBI alone is not sufficient to explain low inflation. Low inflation is closely inter- connected with public attitudes towards price stability. These public attitudes or prefe- rences are part of economic culture of a country. Economic culture, which is influen- ced by historical and institutional experience of a country (Phelps 2011), may be con- sidered as a heuristic device in explaining an inflation performance of an economy. Turkey has experienced a chronic (double digit inflation) inflation in 1980s and 1990s. After the financial crisis of 2001, the transition program for strenghtening the Turkish economy was implemented and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey became independent in the same year. Then inflation decreased to single digit rates in the first decade of 2000. The paper argues that CBI alone is not sufficient to explain a low inf- lation performance of Turkish economy. Low inflation is related with the transformati- on of the economic culture of Turkish economy. From a political economy perspecti- ve, the paper tries to explain the historical and institutional reasons, the economic cul- ture, that lie behind the inflation problem of Turkish economy.

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