İnanma İradesi: WILLIAM James'In İmanın Pragmatİk Savunusu Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme?

Bu çalışmada, James'in inanma iradesi argümanı ve ona yöneltilen bazı itirazlar üzerinde durulmaktadır. James'in argümanı, kişinin, epistemik açıdan meseleye karar veremediği ancak karşı karşıya kaldığı inanç seçeneğinin hakiki bir tercih ifade ettiği durumlarda, tutkusal doğasına dayanarak inanabilmesine olanak sağlar. İlk itiraz olarak, tutkusal doğanın doğruluk konusunda güçlü bir rehber olmadığı ve bu açıdan argümana dayanarak birbiriyle çelişen birçok dini inancın haklı çıkartılabileceği ileri sürülmektedir. İkinci olarak, James'in, bizi bazı doğruları onaylamaktan alıkoyduğu için Clifford'ın delilciliğini suçlarken, aslında kendi argümanında da aynı şeyi yaptığı iddia edilmektedir.

The Will to Believe: An Evaluation of William James's Pragmatic Defence of Faith

The Will to Believe: An Evaluation of William James's Pragmatic Defence of FaithAlthough it has been generally considered that evidential arguments are the only appropriate way to believe that God exists, it has been argued that there are also nonevidential arguments/reasons for belief in God. William James's "The Will to Believe" is one of the most significant non-evidential reasons in favour of religious belief. James criticises Clifford's views and asserts that we have the right to believe even if the evidence is inconclusive. According to Clifford, it is wrong to believe any proposition on insufficient evidence. James's primary goal is to show that Cliffordian evidentialism is irrational because it prevents us from acknowledging certain kinds of truth. And James argues that our passional/non-epistemic nature can determine what we believe when an option is a genuine option which means live, forced, and momentous options and cannot be decided on intellectual/epistemic grounds. The argument briefly enables us to say that "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds". In this essay, I will discuss James's "The Will to Believe" and some objections which have been directed to it. First, I will argue that our passional nature is not a reliable guide to truth and that many conflicting religious beliefs can be justified on this ground. And second, I will argue that although James accuses Clifford's evidentialism of preventing us from acknowledging certain kinds of truth, his argument is equally vulnerable to a similar objection.

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