Kurumların dinamik yapısının ekonomik büyüme üzerine etkisinin analizi

Kurumsal yapı en genel anlamı ile insan ilişkilerini düzenleyen her türlü düşünsel alışkanlığı ifade eder. Kurumlar değişmeyen bir yapı değildir; ekonomik, politik ve sosyal ilişkiler değiştikçe kurumsal yapı da değişir. Kurumlar insanların karşılıklı etkileşimlerinde belirleyici rol oynadığı halde yine insan ilişkilerinden etkilenen dinamik bir yapıdır. Kurumların zaman içinde değişen yapısı, mülkiyet haklarının korunmasını sağlayarak, ülke içi ve ülkeler arası ticareti kolaylaştırarak, inovasyonların gerçekleşmesi için uygun ortamı yaratarak ve politik istikrarı sağlayarak ekonominin performansını etkiler. Bu çalışmada kurumsal yapının dinamik yönü de göz önüne alınarak kurumların ekonomik büyüme üzerine etkisi incelenmiştir.

The analysis of the effect of dynamic structure of institutions on economic growth

Institutional structure, in its most general form expresses any kind of cognitive habit that regulates relationship among individuals. Institutions are not structure without change, as the economic politic and social relations change institutional structure changes as well. Although institutions play a significant role in interaction among individuals it is a dynamic structure affected by relations among individuals. The dynamic structure of institutions affects the performance of the economy through securing property rights, catalyzing trade within and among countries, creating the suitable environment to innovate and establishing political stability. In this study the effect of institutions on economic growth is examined considering the institutions as a dynamic structure.

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