Effects of environmental and organizational factors on Corporate Governance practices

Effects of environmental and organizational factors on Corporate Governance practices

The management literature provides four different approaches to explain the relationships between groups inside a company: Shareholder Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory, Corporate Governance. This paper firstly discusses the theories and subsequently focuses on corporate governance practices. Having investigated the relevant literature, it is concluded that there are some variables that might affect the success of implementation process. These internal and external variables have come together in different ways to create a range of corporate governance systems that reflect specific market structures, legal systems, traditions, regulations, and cultural and societal values. The paper focuses on the effects of corporate culture, firm size and emerging markets and crises on corporate governance practices. It argues that some relationships might exist between design variables of corporate governance application and a firm’s internal and external characteristics; there is no one “best” way to apply a corporate governance system. It is concluded that the success of corporate governance depends on the conditions under which it is employed.

___

  • Aguilera, R. V., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H. and Jackson, G. (2008). An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities. Organization Science, 19(3), 475–492.
  • Allison G.T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Misilse Crises, Boston, MA, Little Brown and Company.
  • Berle, A. A. and Means, G.C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Harcourt Brace.
  • Berle, A.A. (1960). Power without Property, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.
  • Blair, M.M. (1995). Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, The Brookings Institutition, Washington D.C.
  • Blau, P.M. (1970). The Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations, American Sociological Review, 35, April, 201-218.
  • Charron, D.C. (2007). Stockholders And Stakeholders: The Battle For Control Of The Corporation, Cato Journal, 27(1), 1-22.
  • Coase, R.H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 16 (4): 387–405.
  • Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. and Johnson, J.L. (1998). Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269–290.
  • Dalton, D.R. and Daily, C.M. (2000). The Board and Financial Performance: Bigger is Better, NACD’s Director’s Monthly, 24(8), 1–4.
  • Davies, A. (1999). A Strategic Approach to Corporate Governance, Gower, Aldershot.
  • Deakin, S. (2005). The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, 13(1), 11-18.
  • Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence and implications, Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65–91.
  • Dube, I. (2011). Is Corporate Governance The Answer To Corporate Structural Failure?, Us-China Law Review, 8(5), 413-430.
  • Fama, E.F., and Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301–325.
  • Forbes, D.P. and Milliken, F.J. (1999). Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision–making Groups, Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 489–505.
  • Freeman, R.E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman, Boston.
  • Grant, G.H. (2003). The Evolution of Corporate Governance and its Impact on Modern Corporate America, Management Decision, 41(9), 923-934.
  • Hofstede, G.H. (1987). The Cultural Context of Accounting, in Cushing, B. (ed.), Accounting and Culture, American Accounting Association, 1-11, Sarasota, Florida.
  • Immergut, E. (1998). The theoretical core of the new institutionalism, Politics and Society, 26(1): 5–34.
  • Iskander, M.R. and Chamlou N. (2000). Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation, World Bank Group, Washington D.C.
  • Jensen, M. (2000). A Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims and Organizational Forms, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Kaptein, M. (2004). Business codes of multinational firms: what do they say?, Journal of Business Ethics, 50: 13–31.
  • Kay, J. and Silberston, A. (1995). Corporate governance, National Institute Economic Review, 84–97.
  • Knell, A. (2006). Corporate Governance - How to Add Value to Your Company: A Practical Implementation Guide, CIMA Publishing, Oxford.
  • Krambia-Kapardis, M. and Psaros, J. (2006). The Implementation of Corporate Governance Principles in an Emerging Economy: a critique of the situation in Cyprus, Corporate Governance, 14(2), 126-139.
  • Letza, S., Sun, X. and Kirkbride, J. (2004). Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: A Critical Review of Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 242–62.
  • Lubatkin, M, Lane P.J., Collin S., and Very, P. (2007). An Embeddedness Framing of Governance and Opportunism: Towards a Crossnationally Accommodating Theory of Agency, Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 28, 43–58.
  • Mantysaari, P. (2005). Comparative Corporate Governance, Shareholders as a rule-maker, Springer, Berlin.
  • Mazzolini, R. (1981). How Strategic Decisions are Made, Long Range Planning, 14, 85-96.
  • Mintzberg, H. (1990). Strategy Formation: School of Thought, (in) Fredrickson, J.W., (ed) Perspectives on Strategic Management, Harper Business, London, 105-235.
  • Monks, R.A.G., and Minow, N. (2004). Corporate Governance, Third Edition, Blackwell, Oxford.
  • OECD (1999). Principles of Corporate Governance, Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
  • OECD (2003). White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/12/ 2956774.pdf
  • Prowse, S. (1998). Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons from East Asia (at 26). World Bank, Washington, D.C.
  • Schrenk, L.P. (2006). Equityholder Versus Stakeholder and Corporate Governance: Developing a Market for Morality, Business Renaissance Quarterly, 1(3), 81-90.
  • Solomon, J.F., Solomon, A. and Park, C. (2002). A Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10, 29–46.
  • Sonmez, A. and Toksoy, A. (2011). Kurumsal Yönetim İlkelerinin Türkiye’deki Aile İşletmelerine Uygulanabilirliği, Maliye Finans Yazıları, 25(92), 51-90.
  • Sykes, A. (2000). Capitalism for Tomorrow: Reuniting Ownership and Control, Capstone, Oxford.
  • Thelen, K. (1999). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369–404.
  • Wallace, R.S.O. and Gernon, H. (1991). Frameworks for International Comparative Financial Accounting, Journal of Accounting Literature, 10, 209-264.
  • Wearing, R. (2005). Cases in Corporate Governance, SAGE Publications, London.
  • Yoshimori, M. (2005). Does Corporate Governance Matter? Why the Corporate Performance of Toyota and Canon is Superior to GM and Xerox, Corporate Governance, 13(3), 447-457.