TÜRKİYE'NİN GÜNEY KAFKASYA POLİTİKASI VE ERMENİSTAN İLE İLİŞKİLERİ

Güney Kafkasya’da irredantist politikalar, bölgedeki güvensizliği beslemekte ve bölgede çatışma potansiyeli taşıyan donmuş sorunların canlanmasına; başta ekonomi ve güvenlik olmak üzere birçok alanda istikrarsızlığa yol açmaktadır. Türkiye’nin bölgedeki nüfuzu, etki alanı oluşturma çabaları bölgedeki çatışmalardan doğrudan etkilenmektedir. Türkiye Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan’la ticaret ve enerji alanında işbirliğini geliştirmekte ancak Dağlık Karabağ sorununun devam etmesi nedeni ile Ermenistan’a yönelik temkinli politikasını sürdürmektedir. Ekim 1987'de Dağlık Karabağ'da çıkan bir idari kriz sonucunda Ermenistan'da SSCB Döneminde başlayan Dağlık Karabağ krizi, 1988'de Dağlık Karabağ Yüksek Sovyeti'nin SSCB ve Azerbaycan Yüksek Sovyetleri tarafından reddedilen, Ermenistan'a bağlanma kararından sonra 1989 yılında silahlı çatışmaya dönüşmüştür. 1994'de imzalanan Bişkek Ateşkes Anlaşması sonrası sorunun çözümüne yönelik Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (AGİT) bünyesinde Rusya, Fransa ve ABD'nin eşbaşkanlığını yaptığı Minsk Grubu da henüz bir sonuç alamamıştır. İki ülke dışişleri bakanları tarafından yürütülen ve 2004 yılından beri devam eden müzakereler Prag Süreci olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Fransa, Rusya ve Amerika bu müzakerelere aracılık etmektedir. Her iki tarafta bir anlaşmaya varıldığı takdirde şu anda Dağlık Karabağ’da Ermeni güçler tarafından işgal edilen yedi bölgeden beşinin uluslararası garantörlerin gözlemciliğinde tekrar Azerbaycan’a iade edilmesi konusunda hem fikir olmuşlardır. Ermenistan, Dağlık Karabağ bölgesinin yüzde doksan beşini, Karabağ’ın dışında bulunan Azerbaycan topraklarının da yaklaşık yüzde onbeşini işgal altında bulundurmaktadır. 30 Ocak 1992’de Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan’ın AGİK üyesi olması ile sorun uluslararası bir boyut kazanmıştır. Azerilerin tekrar Karabağ’a dönebilme durumu aynı zamanda referandum olasılığını da gündeme getirmektedir. Bununla birlikte özellikle son dönemde iki ülke arasında sık sık yaşanan ateşkes ihlalleri, Güney Kafkasya bölgesinin her an daha büyük bir çatışmaya sahne olabileceği ihtimalini ortaya koymaktadır. Ermenistan 21 Eylül 1991’de bağımsızlığını ilan ettiğinde bu gelişme Türkiye’de tehdit olarak algılanmamış aksine SSCB’nin dağılması bölge için büyük bir fırsat olarak görülmüştür. Nitekim Türkiye 1991’de Ermenistan’ın bağımsızlığını hiçbir ön koşul öne sürmeden tanıdığı gibi bu dönemde ciddi bir ekonomik dar boğazdan geçen Ermenistan’a 1992-93 yıllarında Batı’dan gelen yardımların ulaştırılabilmesi için Türkiye kendi sınırlarının kullanılmasına izin vermiştir. Ermenistan, 1992’de Karadeniz’e kıyısı olmamasına karşın kurucu üye olarak Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği (KEİ) teşkilatına davet edildi ve böylece Türkiye ve Azerbaycan ile diyalog için önemli bir diplomatik platform olmasının yanı sıra kendini güçlendirecek uluslararası bir teşkilata üye olmuş oldu. Türkiye-Ermenistan ilişkilerini olumsuz etkileyen konular arasında sözde "Ermeni Soykırımı" iddiaları ve diaspora Ermenilerinin bulundukları ülkelerde Türkiye aleyhine çıkardıkları kararlar önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Diğer yandan Ermenistan'ın Dağlık Karabağ'ı ve Azerbaycan topraklarını işgal etmesi sonrasında Türkiye, Azerbaycan'ın yanında yer alarak Ermenistan'a karşı ambargo uygulamıştır.

Turkish Studies International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 10/2 Winter 2015, p. 963-978

The irredentist policies in the South Caucasia feed insecurity in the region; cause to the activation of the frozen problems which have potential to conflict; and cause to unstability in numerous realms primarily in economy and security. The influence power of Turkey in the region and its activities to constitute an influence circle are being directly affected by the conflicts in the region. Turkey now takes forward the cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia in commerce and energy realms; however maintains cautious policies towards Armenia since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which began by an administrative crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh in SU era in1987, and after the NagornoKarabakh high soviet’s decision of joining to Armenia in 1988 but refused by high Soviets of SU and Azerbaijan, it turned into a war. After the ratification of the ceasefire of Bishkek in 1994, the Minsk Group which is under the authority The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and which Russia, France and the US maintain the co-chair, couldn’t accomplish. The negotiations which have been implemented by the Foreign ministers of the two countries since 2004, are called as the Prague Process. Russia, France and the US have been mediating these negotiations. Both sides have accepted the point that the five of the seven regions which were occupied by Armenia would be given again to Azerbaijan under the control of the international guarantors, if both sides would agree. Armenia now holds under occupation 95% of Nagorno-Karabakh and out of Nagorno-Karabakh 15% of Azerbaijan. The conflict has turned an international problem after Azerbaijan and Armenia became OSCE members. The returning possibility of Azeris to Karabakh, would bring the matter of a memorandum possibility. On the other hand, the ceasefire violations which has occured recently more, show the possibility for a bigger conflict in the South Caucasia region. Armenia’s declaration of independency in September 21 of 1991 was not perceived as a threat but contrarily the dissolution of SU wasunderstood as a great opportunity for the region. Thus, while Turkey accepted Armenia’s independency without any reservations, gave permission for using its borders for the reliefs from the West to Armenia in 1992-93 which suffered a economic crisis at that time. Armenia was invited as an establisher state for the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, thus this constituted a diplomatic platform with Turkey and Azerbaijan; and Armenia became a member of an organisation which would empower it. The so-called “Armenian genocide” claims and administrative decisions which Armenian diaspora achieved to take in the states which they live, constitute points which negatively affect Turkish-Armenian relations. In addition, Turkey has supported Azerbaijan and implemented ambargoe against Armenia, after Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and several parts of Azerbaijan. Through a Swiss mediatorship in September 10 of 2009, Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers signed the protocols about establishing diplomatic relations and reopening the border gates in the future. The two protocols would be implemented two months later they were signed, after the legislative assemblies of two states would confirm the protocols. However, two assemblies haven’t signed the protocols yet. Turkey mentioned that, the confirmation would be valid only after the five regions in the Nagorno-Karabakh would be free. Armenia reacted negatively answering that Turkey’s demands are not put forward as preconditions to the protocols. In addition, Armenia claimed that Turkey unilaterally closed the border gates therefore Turkey could not put forward additional preconditions. The Azeri people reacted to that, Azeri flag was not permitted to bring into the stadium when Turkish and Armenian national football teams played a match in October 14 of 2009. But later, Azerbaijan calmed the reactions which had occured with the ratification of the protocols, being persuaded by Turkish highest statesmen. In addition, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan assured that, if any achievement couldn’t get in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the border gates would not be opened. Azerbaijan realizes that the matter couldn’t be resolved only constituting pressure over Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh problem also concerns third countries primarily Russia. Russia in fact, does not aim that the problem would be resolved in favour of only one of the states in the problem, since Russia demands the continuity of its influence over the region. Azerbaijan takes a strategy which contains weakening Armenia through implementing embargoe to Armenia; excluding Armenia from the international projects such as Baku-TiblisiCeyhan Pipeline Project and Baku-Tiblisi-Kars railway Project. The possibility of opening the motorway border gate between Turkey and Armenia would weaken the economic pressure over Armenia. This situation led Turkey to realize that persuading the US and Russia is a necessity to advance Turkey’s relations with Armenia and to take forward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. One of the primary elements in Turkey’s policies towards the South Caucasia is no doubt, empowering its position for a route which would carry the rich energy resources of the region to the western markets; and enabling the energy security. In this context, Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project and ErzurumŞahdeniz natural gas Pipeline Project which takes the natural gas from Azerbaijan’s rich Şahdeniz natural gas resource, were constructed and started. The connection of this Project to Greece has been realized. Constructing a Trans-Caspian line which would be a significant part of Nabucco line and would pass under the Caspian Sea is also planned. The attempts for regional peace constitutes a pillar of Turkey’s energy policies towards the South Caucasia region. Therefore, in the case that an advancement would be gained in the relations between Turkey and Armenia; and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is a possibility for Nabucco Project which was planned to carry natural gas over Turkish territory to EU states, to turn into regional peace Project including Armenia. The Caucasia region, due to being a place which intersects the ways which go to Asia, Europe and Africa via the Middle East historically; and the ways which go to the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Indian Ocean via the Gulf Bay always has been a competing area for the big powers. The region nowadays turns a scene in which a conflict of powers remain. The increasing insecurity in the region, the existing problems which could not been resolved for many years such as the NagornoKarabakh conflict, the revival of the frozen conflicts which have a potential to turn a war cause unstability in many realms such as economy and security primarily. This situation prevents Turkey’s demands of advancing the relations towards the states of the region, primarily in commerce and energy realms. Turkey demands to empower its position to be a route which carries the rich energy resources of the region to the western markets. This situation would also contribute the energy security of Turkey. Turkey’s South Caucasia policy contains in energy realm to actualize giant energy projects such as BTC, Shahdeniz-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline, TANAP; at the same time to empower the cooperation between states in the region to achieve regional peace and stability. Therefore, the actualization of the oil and natural gas pipeline projects would both contribute to integration of the states of the region with the international markets; and would contribute for their internal and external peace. As a result, Turkey wishes to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus. Because of this Turkey also wants to normalize its bilateral relations with Armenia. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia on 16 December 1991, short after its independence. But some historical events have negatively been influencing their relations. Armenia is accusing Turkey for 1915 events in the Ottoman lands in the First World War, although Turkey has refusing it from the first time. Armenia uses this issue against Turkey in the internationalpublic opinon. Some European countries also are using this issue against Turkey’s full membership in the European Union. In the issue of Nagarno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1993, Turkey was taken some steps in favor of Azerbaijan and closed its borders with Armenia. On the other hand Armenia is operating a nuclear power plant near the border of Turkey, which have several impacts on Turkish environment. In spite of these vital issues, Turkey had been lifted the restrictions on Armenians entering Turkey in January 2002 and opened its airspace to Armenia in2005. Turkish president Abdullah Gul was visited Armenia in 2008. Two ‘Protocols’ was finalized in 2009 for the establishment and development of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the protocols have been submitted to relevant authorities for ratification. So, further steps are needed to normalize the relations between the two neighbour countries.

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