İşlevselcilik Qualia'yı Reddeder mi?

Zihin felsefesinde 1970’lerden bu yana en etkili bilinç teorisi olan işlevselcilik zihinsel durumları, kendilerini oluşturan içsel yapıya bağlı olmadan parçası oldukları sistemdeki nedensel rollerine göre ele alan görüştür. 1980’li yıllarda Ned Block ve John Searle gibi filozoflar işlevselciliğin deneyimin asli unsuru olan qualia’yı dışladığını iddia ederek bu görüşü eleştirmiştir. Qualia deneyimin öznel ve niteliksel özelliğidir. Block ve Searle’e göre bir zihin teorisi deneyimin öznel ve niteliksel yönüyle de hasaplaşabilmelidir. Bu makalede amacım qualia’ya dair bir açıklama sunmanın işlevselciliğin sınırlarının dışında olduğunu göstermektir. İşlevselcilik deneyimle ilgili ontolojik sorularla ilgilenmeyen, nedensel sorulara cevap bulmaya çalışan bir girişimdir. Buna rağmen işlevselci programa bağlı olup ontolojik çıkarımlar yapan felsefeciler mevcuttur. Örneğin Daniel Dennett bilincin bir tür bilgi işleme sistemi olduğunu söyler ve qualia’yı reddeder. Hilary Putnam ve David Chalmers gibi işlevselciler ise bilince dair ontolojik çıkarımlarda bulunmadıkları gibi qualiayı da reddetmezler. Bu noktada, teorileri ve onları savunan kişilerin motivasyonlarını birbirinden ayırarak Block ve Searle’ün eleştirilerinin işlevselcilikten ziyade Dennett gibi bazı işlevselcilere yönelik olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini iddia edeceğim.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

İşlevselcilik, Qualia, Bilinç, İşlev, Çoklu Gerçeklenme

Does Functionalism Reject Qualia?

Functionalism, the most influential theory of consciousness in the philosophy of mind since the 1970s, is the idea that addresses the mental states according to their causal roles in the system of which they are a part, independently from the internal structure that constitutes them. In the 1980s, on the other hand, philosophers such as Ned Block and John Searle suggested that functionalism excluded qualia, which is the fundamental element of experience, and criticized this idea. Qualia is the subjective and qualitative characteristic of experience. Block and Searle thought that a theory of mind should also handle the subjective and qualitative aspect of the experience. My goal in this study is to show that bringing an explanation to qualia is beyond the limits of functionalism. Functionalism is an attempt to find answers to causal questions and is not interested in ontological questions of experience. Nevertheless, some philosophers are attached to a functionalistic program and make ontological inferences. For example, Daniel Dennett says that consciousness is a kind of information processing system, and he rejects qualia. Functionalists such as Hilary Putnam and David Chalmers do not make ontological inferences about consciousness, nor do they reject qualia. At this point, by distinguishing between the theories and the motivations of their proponents, I will claim that Block and Searle's criticisms should be evaluated as directed against some functionalists such as Dennett rather than functionalism itself.

Keywords:

Functionalism, Qualia, Consciousness, Function, Multiple Realizability,

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