Mali yerelleşme alanında ortaya çıkan yeni yaklaşımlar: Kuşaklar arası çatışma mı?

1990’ların ortasından itibaren kamu ekonomisi alanı dışındaki çeşitli görüşlerden yararlanarak çok katlı devletin yapı ve işleyişine yeni bir anlayış sağlayan mali yerelleşmenin ikinci kuşak yaklaşımları ortaya çıkmaya başladı. İkinci kuşak yaklaşımlar kendinden önceki bugün artık birinci kuşak olarak adlandırılan yaklaşımın iyilikseverlik ve tekdüzelik olmak üzere iki temel dayanağına itiraz eder ve buradan yola çıkar. Siyasi yöneticilerin vatandaşların çıkarlarını sağlamak üzere bir dürtülerinin olmadığını, bu yüzden bilgi ve teşvik sorunlarının ortaya çıktığı durumda hangi biçimde bir yönetim yapısının etkin kamu malı sunumunu ve piyasa teşviklerini korumayı nasıl yerine getireceğini irdeler. Bu çalışmada, ikinci kuşak teorilerin temeldeki kaygıları, itirazları, dayanakları ve piyasayı koruyucu devleti sağlamanın koşulu olarak gördükleri önerileri inceleme konusu edilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu iki kuşak arasında belirgin bir çatışmanın yaşanıp yaşanmadığının anlaşılmasına, farklılık ve benzerliklerinin açığa çıkarılmasına çalışılmıştır.

The new approaches emerging in the fiscal decentralization: Is it a conflict between generations?

Since the mid-1990s, drawing on ideas from outside the field of public economics, a new second generation theory of fiscal decentralization has begun to emerge, which provides new insights into the structure and working of multi-level government. Second generation approaches refuse two main assumptions of now called first generation theory of fiscal decentralization, “benevolent behavior on the part of public agents” and “uniformity in the centralized provision of local public services” and set out here. Second generation asserts that there are no incentives of political officials to further the interest of citizens, so in the case of information and incentives problems, what kind of governments, and how to commit to providing efficient public goods and preserving market incentives. Purpose of this study is to find out the main concerns, the challenges, the considerations, and the implications that they entirely observe as conditions for providing the preserving market state of second generation theory. In addition, effort is made to come out whether there is a significant conflict between these two generations and to also reveal the differences and the comparations between them.

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