MALİ BASKINLIK VE MERKEZ BANKASI BAĞIMSIZLIĞI İLİŞKİSİ

Merkez bankalarının enflasyon hedeflemesi stratejisi ya da fiyat istikrarını sağlama hedefi ile birlikte uygulanan başarılı bir mali disiplin para ve maliye politikaları arasındaki koordinasyonun iyileşmesine katkı sağlamaktadır. Buna karşılık mali baskınlığın ortaya çıkması ve merkez bankalarının bağımsızlığını zayıflatması pek çok sorunu beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın amacı mali baskınlık ile merkez bankası bağımsızlığı arasındaki ilişkiyi ampirik olarak araştırmaktır. Diğer çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışmada Euro bölgesine dâhil olmayan AB ülkeleri (Bulgaristan, Çekya, Danimarka, Hırvatistan, İngiltere, İsveç, Letonya, Litvanya, Macaristan, Polonya, Romanya) ve AB’ye aday statüsünde bulunan Türkiye örneklem olarak alınmıştır. 2000-2016 dönemi verileri ile yapılan panel eşbütünleşme ve nedensellik testlerinin sonuçlarına göre mali baskınlık ile merkez bankası bağımsızlığı arasında eşbütünleşme ilişkisi ve iki yönlü nedensellik ilişkisi olduğu belirlenmiştir. Dinamik en küçük kareler (DOLS) eşbütünleşme tahmincisi sonuçlarına göre, panelin genelinde mali baskınlıkta meydana gelen %1’lik artış merkez bankası bağımsızlığını %0.22 azaltmakta iken ülkelere özgü sonuçlar farklılaşmaktadır.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN FISCAL DOMINANCE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

A successful fiscal discipline applied with central banks’ price stability target or inflation targeting strategy contributes to the improvement of the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. On the other hand, the emergence of financial dominance and weakening the independence of the central banks brings with it many problems. In this regard, the aim of the study is to investigate the nexus between fiscal dominance and central bank independence empirically. Unlike other studies, in this study Non-Eurozone EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and UK) and Turkey, which is in candidate status to European Union, were taken as a sample. The results of panel cointegration and causality tests conducted with the 2000-2016 period data show that there is a cointegration relationship and bi-directional causality between fiscal dominance and central bank independence. Besides that dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) cointegration estimator results express that when fiscal dominance increases 1%, central bank independence decreases 0.22% and specific results of countries differ by countries

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