Ana akıma bir alternatif: Nöroiktisat

İktisat yazınında bireylerin karar alma davranışları neoklasik devrimle birlikte, bireysel faydayımaksimize etmeye yönelik rasyonel bir gayret olarak tanımlanmıştır. Neoklasik iktisatta bireysel kararalmanın merkezine oturan rasyonellik kavramı pek çok iktisatçı tarafından gerçek insan davranışınıyansıtmadığı gerekçesiyle çoğu kez eleştirilmiş ve bunu gerçekle uyumlaştırmaya çalışan pek çokyaklaşım ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yaklaşımların en önemlilerinden birisi de 90’ların sonlarında beliren ve2000’li yıllarda gelişimini sürdüren nöroiktisattır. Bu çalışma, nörobilimin ölçüm tekniklerini kullanarakiktisadi kararlar üretmede beynin çevresiyle etkileşimini anlamaya çalışan bu yeni interdisipliner alanın,belirsizlik altında karar alma ve zamanlar arası seçim ekseninde genel çerçevesini sunmayıamaçlamaktadır.

An alternative to the mainstream: Neuroeconomics

Decision-making in economics literature has been described as a rational effort to maximize individualutility beginning from the neoclassical revolution. Rationalityas a core element of the human decisionmaking in neoclassical economics has been criticized by many economists for not representing realhuman behavior and many approaches emerged in order to align theory with the reality. One of the mostimport of those is neuroeconomics which emerged in late 90’s and pursuing its developmentin 2000’s.This study aims to present the main framework of this emerging interdiciplinary field trying tounderstand how the brain interacts with its environment to produce economic decisions by usingneuroscientific measurement techniques in the axis of decision making under uncertainty andintertemporal choice.

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