Kamu dış borç piyasalarının varlığı ve reform teklifleri

Kamu dış borç piyasaları devletler ile özel kişilerin buluştuğu uluslararası borç piyasa- larıdır. Bu piyasaların 3 ana unsuru vardır: Kreditörler, devletler, ödünç verilecek finan- sal fonlar. Kamu dış borç piyasalarının varlığını devam ettirebilmesi sözkonusu 3 ana unsurun gelecekte de var olmasını gerektirir. Çalışmamızda kamu dış borç piyasalarının gelecekte de var olabilmesi ve reformlar üzerine odaklanılmıştır. Teklif edilen reformlar şunlardır: (1) uluslararası iflas (borç) mahkemesi ihdas edilmesi, (2) kamu dış borç piyasalarında geleneksel teminatlı borç verme sistemine geçilmesi, (3) kreditörler arasında “koordinasyon” ve “bedavacılık” probleminin çözülmesi, (4) müzakerelere 3. tarafın dâhil olması, (5) orijinal borç söz- leşmelerine “eşit muamele”, “kıdemlillik-önceliklilik” gibi prensiplerin girmesi, (6) kredi- törlerin borç verdikleri hükumetin başka kreditörlerden yeni borç almasını kontrol ede- bilmesi, (7) uluslararası son ödünç verici merciin varlığı, (8) uluslararası finansal mura- kabe sisteminin kurulması, (9) hem stratejik ve normal acziyet hem de ödeyebilme ve likidite acziyetleri arasında ayrım yapılması, (10) likidite krizini yatıştırmak ve krizden çıkış için borçlu hükumete uluslararası piyasalardan taze ödünç sağlanması, (11) ge- lişmekte olan ülkelerin birikmiş dış borçlarının yeniden yapılandırılarak dış borç indiri- mine gidilmesi ve vadelerinin uzatılması.

Surviving of sovereign external debt markets in the future and reform’s suggestions

overeign markets are the international debt markets in which sovereign governments and private persons come together. There are 3 main fundemantals of these markets. They are those: creditors, sovereign governments, and the financial funds in order to be given as loans. Surviving of the sovereign markets in the future requires that the existance of all 3 fundemantals survive also in the future. In our papper it was foccused on the surviving of the sovereign markets in the futu- re, and the reforms required. The reforms suggested were ordered as that: (1) the es- tablishment of an internatioanal bankcruptcy (debt) court, (2) the transition to the tra- ditional collaterally lending debt system in the sovereign markets, (3) the solution of the “coordination” and “free-rider” problems amongs creditors, (4) introduction of third gamer to the bargaining of debts between creditors and borrowers, (5) introduction of the “parri passu”, “seniority”, etc. principals to the orijinal debt contracts, (6) the creditor’s controlling the borrower’s new borrowing from another creditor in order to prevent the increase in the total external debt burden of the borrower, (7) the existance of “the international lender of last resort”, (8) the foundation of an international financial supervisory-regulatory system about international sovereign markets, (9) making dif- fer both normal default from stratejic default and also the liquidity default from solvency default, (10) providing new loan from internatioanal markets in order to calm down the liquidity crisis and to recover from the crisis, (11) both the reduction in the external debt of the developping countries and making lengthen the average maturity of the debts.

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