GENİŞLETİLMİŞ DÜZENLER BAĞLAMINDA LİBERAL ANAYASACILIĞIN SORUNLARI

Klasik liberalizm geleneğinde en istikrarlı ve bütüncül anayasal reform talebi kamu tercihi teorisyenleri tarafından yapılmaktadır. Özellikle Amerikalı yazarlar mevcut konvansiyonel kuvvetler ayrılığı ve denge-denetleme kurumlarının bireylerin birbirleri üzerinde negatif dışsallık yaratma imkanlarını yeterince sınırlandıramadığını ve liberal demokrasilerin rant kollayan toplumlara doğru hızla ilerlediğini ileri sürmektedirler. Bu bağlamda yazarlar anayasaların epistemik ahlaki önermelerle demokratik prosedürlerin sert bir şekilde kısıtlanmasını teklif etmektedirler. Bu çalışmada Hayekyen bilgi ve sosyal teori bağlamında dışsal sınırlamaların neden anayasalar için gerekli olan liberal ilkeleri koruyamayacağı açıklanmaktadır. Dışsal sınırlamalar yerine Hayek’in iki kamaralı meclis teklifinin liberal ilkelerin keşfi için neden daha önemli bir anayasal tadilat teklifi olduğu tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Hayek, kamusal tercih, rasyonel cehalet, faydacılık, anayasacılık

Problems of Liberal Constitutionalism in the Context of Extended Orders

In the tradition of classical liberalism, public choice theorists have called for the most consistent and holistic constitutional reform. American authors in particular argue that existing conventional institutions of separation of powers and checks and balances do not sufficiently limit the ability of individuals to create negative externalities on each other and that liberal democracies are rapidly moving towards rent-seeking societies. In this context, the authors propose that constitutions should impose strict constraints on democratic procedures through epistemic moral propositions. This paper explains why, in the context of Hayekian knowledge and social theory, external constraints cannot protect the liberal principles necessary for constitutions. It will be argued why Hayek's proposal for a bicameral parliament instead of external constraints is a more important constitutional amendment proposal for the discovery of liberal principles.

Keywords:

Hayek, public choice, rational ignorance, utilitarianism, constitutionalism,

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