Mustafa Sencer Karagül, Mustafa Hasöksüz, Fahriye Saraç, Mevlüt Demirbaş, ORBAY SAYI

BSL-3 laboratuvarlarında SARS-CoV-2 biyorisklerinin azaltılması

Amaç: Bu çalışmamın amacı biyorisk analizi yaparak SARS-CoV-2 virüsü kaynaklı laboratuvar egzoz hava tahliyesine ait biyogüvenlik risklerini COVID-19 pandemisine karşı aşı geliştirilen biyogüvenlik seviye-3 laboratuvarında azaltmaktır. Gereç ve Yöntem: Çalışmada COVID-19 pandemisine karşı mücadelede spesifik laboratuvar çalışmaları için kullanımı hedeflenen biyogüvelik-3 seviyesinde yüksek güvenlikli laboratuvarın altyapısı ve organizasyonu risk değerlendirmesi için seçilmiştir. Risk değerlendirme matrisi ile yüksek güvenlikli laboratuvarlarda kritik bir öneme sahip ısıtma-ventilasyon-havalandırma sisteminin ilişkili alt bileşeni laboratuvar egzoz havasının tahliye prosedürü risk analizi ile değerlendirilmiştir. Bulgular: Risk analizi sonrası risk azaltma stratejisi olarak biyogüvenlik-3 seviye laboratuvarın egzoz havasının, tahliyesi öncesi hava kanallarında 90 C° sıcaklığa maruz bırakılması belirlenmiştir. Çalışmada belirlenen proses uygulamaya alınarak egzoz havasının yüksek verimlilikteki partikül hava filtreleri aracılığıyla filtrasyonu ile tahliyesi öncesinde ilave bir biyogüvenlik bariyeri oluşturmuştur. Söz konusu yeni oluşturulan biyogüvenlik bariyeri, çalışmaya ait biyolojik riski düşürerek laboratuvar için daha güvenli bir çalışma ortamı sağlamıştır. Laboratuvar ile çevre arasında ise yeni ve ekstra bir biyogüvenlik önlemi oluşturularak mevcut biyogüvenlik statüsü güçlendirilmiştir. İlave alınan risk azaltma önlemi sonrası yenilenen risk değerlendirmesine göre nihai risk kabul edilebilir seviyeye düşürülmüştür. Öneri: Yüksek güvenlikli laboratuvarda başarılı biyogüvenlik sistemleri için tesise ve uygulamalara spesifik risk değerlendirilmelerinin yapılması zaruridir. Çalışmada gerçekleştirilen risk değerlendirmesi sonuçlarına göre laboratuvarın özellikle pandemi döneminde riskten kaçınan bir yaklaşım ile ilave risk azaltma yollarını tercih etmeleri biyogüvenlik konusunda tesise fayda sunacaktır.

Mitigation of the biosafety risks of SARS-CoV-2 at BSL-3 laboratories

Aim: The aim of this study is to reduce the biosafety risks of laboratory exhaust air due to SARS-CoV-2 at a biosafety level-3 laboratory used for vaccine development against COVID-19 pandemic. Materials and Methods: In this study, the infrastructure and the organisation of the containment laboratory, which aimed to be used to struggle with pandemic, was used for risk assessment. Assessment of the laboratory exhaust air procedure as a component of the heating-ventilation-air conditioning system, which is significant for high-level biosafety laboratories, was conducted through a risk assessment matrix. Results: A heating system providing exhaust air exposure to heat at 90 C° before being discharged to the outside was selected as the risk mitigation strategy after the risk analysis. The system was established as an additional biosafety barrier before the discharge of laboratory exhaust air passing through high-efficiency particulate filters. The biosafety barriers provide a safer working environment by reducing the biological risk stemming from the laboratory work. It also strengthens the existing biosafety status by building a novel and extra biosafety barrier between the laboratory and the outside environment. The residual risk was reduced to an acceptable level with the help of an additional mitigation measure regarding reassessment. Conclusion: Conducting risk assessment peculiar to practices and the facility is a necessity for the successful biosafety system at high-level biosafety laboratories. According to the risk assessment carried out in this study, creating additional risk mitigation at laboratories by the guidance of a risk-averse approach particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic might provide biosafety advantages.

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