2015

Locke on Liberty and Necessity

John Locke'a göre özgür irade anlamsızdır. O gönüllü olmasının tek başına bir eylemin özgür olmasını garnti etmeye yetmediğini iddia etmektedir. Buna ek olarak, Locke demektedir ki; bütün eylemler, "özgür" eylemler de dahil, nedensel olarak belirlenmektedir. Locke'ın özgür irade ve eylem kuramının bu özelliklerine dayanarak, bazı filozoflar Locke'ın bir bağdaştırcı olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Ne var ki, Locke'ın Humecu anlamda bir bağdaştırcı olmaktan çok bir özgürlükçü olduğunu düşünmek için iyi nedenleri vardır. Locke, bir insanın önceden belirlenmiş bir kaderle doğduğunu reddetmektedir. Ayrıca, o bir bireyin bir şey yapmaya karar verdikten sonra bile o şeyi yapıp yapmamak konusunda tarafsız bir durum içerisinde olduğuna inanmaktadır. Ve özgür irade kavramını reddetmesine rağmen, o insanın özgür olduğu düşüncesini tamamen benimsemektedir.

Locke'ın Özgürlük ve Zorunluluk Anlayışı Üzerine

For John Locke, free will is nonsensical. He contends that mere voluntariness is insufficient for freedom of action. In addition, he points out, all actions, covering "free" actions are causally determined. On the ground of these characteristics of Locke's account of free will and action, some philosophers conclude that Locke is a compatibilist. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that Locke is a libertarian rather than a compatibilist in the Humean sense. Locke denies that a person is born with a predetermined destiny. Moreover, he holds that there is indifferency even after an agent decides to do something. And although he rejects the notion of freedom of will, he thoroughly espouses the notion of freedom of man.

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