Popper'ın Aksiyomatik Olasılık Kuramı ve Değer-Atama Problemi

Kolmogorov tarafindan geliştirilen standard olasılık kuramında, A olayının B olayına koşullu olasılığı, P(A|B)= P(AB))/(P(B)) oranı ile tanımlanmaktadır. Bu oran, paydanın yani koşul olayının olasılığının sıfır olduğu durumlarda tanımsız-dır. Literatürde sıfır-payda problemi olarak adlandırılan bu problem, Karl Pop-per’a göre ciddi bir kavramsal zaafiyettir. Bu problemi çözmek için, Popper ko-şullu olasılığı temel alan alternatif bir aksiyomatik olasılık kuramı geliştirmiştir. Önemle belirtilmelidir ki, bu aksiyomatik kuram, Popper’ın yaygın olarak bili-nen eğilimci (propensity) olasılık yaklaşımından tümü ile ayrı ve bağımsız bir kuramdır. Popper geliştirdiği aksiyomatik kuramın sıfır-payda problemini çöz-düğü için bilim felsefesi ve istatistik gibi alanlarındaki olasılık uygulamalarına daha uygun olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu iddia temelinde, Popper’ın aksiyomatik kuramının standard Kolmogorov kuramına göre ciddi bir kavramsal üstünlüğe sahip olduğu literatürde sıklıkla dile getirilmektedir. Bu makalede, Popper’ın aksiyomatik kuramı sıfır-payda problemi çerçevesinde incelenmekte ve gerçek-ten böylesi bir kavramsal üstünlüğe sahip olup olmadığı değerlendirilmektedir.

Popper's Axiomatic Probability System and the Value-Assignment Problem

In the standard theory of probability, developed by Kolmogorov, the concept of conditional probability is defined with what is known as the ratio formula: the probability of A given B is the ratio between the probability of A and B and the probability of B, i.e. P(A|B)= (P(AB))/(P(B)). Clearly, this ratio is not defined when the probability of the condition, P(B), is 0. According to Popper, this problem, which is known as the zero-denominator problem, shows a serious conceptual shortcoming of the standard Kolmogorovian theory of probability. In order to overcome this shortcoming, Popper developed an al-ternative axiomatic theory of probability where conditional probability is taken as primitive. It should be noted that this axiomatic probability theory is differ-ent than and independent from Popper’s philosophy of probability which is based on the propensity approach. Popper claims that his axiomatic theory is a better fit for the use of probability in the philosophy of science and statistics. Based on this claim, it is often stated that Popper’s theory is conceptually supe-rior to Kolmogorov’s theory. The ultimate aim of this paper is to evaluate this claim by analyzing Popper’s axiomatic theory within the context of the zero-denominator problem.

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