Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı: Karşılaşılan Güçlükler ve Sınırlamalar

Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde, merkez bankasına bağımsızlık kazandırıl-masında birçok güçlük ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bunlar; GSYİH'ya göre finansal sistemin oldukça küçük olması, yüksek enflasyon oranları, bankacılık sisteminin zayıflığı, yüksek mali (fiskal) hakimiyet derecesi ve politik istikrarsızlıktır. Bu faktörler ortadan kaldırılmadıkça ve liberalizasyon ve özelleştirme gibi etkin politik reformlar uygulanmadıkça, merkez bankasına bağımsızlık kazandırılmasının istenilen faydaları sağlamayabileceği ileri sürülmektedir.

In developing countries, there are several obstacles for granting central bank independence. These are the small size of financial system relative to GDP (shallow financial markets), high inflation rates, weakness of banking system, high rates of fiscal dominance and political instability. It is argued that establishing an independent central bank may not be produced its intended benefits unless these factors are removed and efficient policy reforms like liberalization and privatization are implemented.

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