BM GENEL SEKRETERİ’NİN KIBRIS’A YÖNELİK İYİ NİYET MİSYONU VE BUNUNLA İLGİLİ BAZI KARARLARIN DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

Bu araştırmada, BM Genel Sekreteri'nin Kıbrıs'a ilişkin iyi niyet misyonu ve bununla ilgili birtakım kararlar ele alınmıştır. Bundan hareketle araştırmada, BM Genel Sekreteri'nin iyi niyet misyonunun ne olduğu, uygulamadaki değişiklikleri ve buna dair alınan birtakım kararların analizleri yapılarak incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Aslında Kıbrıs sorununun BM çerçevesinde barışçı, hakça ve kalıcı bir çözüme kavuşturulmasıyla ilgili çabalar, her iki tarafa da geniş manevra sahası sağlamıştır. Her şeyden önce 1974'ten sonra konuya doğrudan müdahil olan taraflar daha rahat hareket etme şansını elde etmişlerdir. Bu rahatlık, çatışma alanını ve şiddetini daha da artırmıştır. Bu tehlikeli durum, sadece adadaki Kıbrıs Türk ve Rum halklarını etkilemiş, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın da bu meseleye katılmasına neden olmuştur. Özellikle BM'nin Kıbrıs'ta 'barışçı çözümsüzlükten', 'barışçı çözüme' ulaşmadaki başarısızlığı bu yönü ile dikkat çekicidir. Zira taraflar, BM platformunu kalıcı bir çözüme ulaşmak yerine, karşı tarafı yenilgiye uğratmak için kullanmışlardır. Bu koşullar sürdükçe, Gali ve Annan gibi iddialı Genel Sekreterlerin bu sorunu kolayca çözemeyeceği ortadadır. Bundan hareketle Genel Sekreter'in belirlenen yetkileri, iki yönden incelenmesi gerekmiştir. Bunlardan birincisi, Genel Sekreter'in Güvenlik Konseyi'nden aldığı yetkileri, Kıbrıs'ta iki ayrı egemen toplumun mevcudiyetinin tanınmasına yönelik bir zemin üzerinde kullanılıp kullanılamadığı, diğeri de Genel Sekreter'in 'iyi niyet' misyonunun 'arabuluculuğa', daha sonra 'hakemliğe' dönüşüp dönüşmediği ve dönüşmüş ise bunun nasıl icra edilip edilemeyeceğinin belirlenmesidir. Bu gerçekten hareketle araştırma, üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde BM'nin anlaşmazlıkların çözümü için uyguladığı barışçı yöntemler ele alınmış, ikinci bölümde Genel Sekreteri'nin iyi niyet misyonunun temel özellikleri ve bununla ilgili alınan birtakım kararların analitik değerlendirmesi yapılmış, üçüncü ve son bölümde ise BM Genel Sekreterliği'nin Kıbrıs meselesindeki tavrının nedenleri ve sonuçları değerlendirilmiştir

THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’S GOODWILL MISSION TOWARDS CYPRUS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF SOME OF THE RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THIS (1954-1992)

The purpose of this research is to determine whether the content and the function of the Goodwill Mission of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus have changed in time. The complexity and the stalemate of the Cyprus issue led third parties to be involved in this process in order to overcome the disagreements. From this perspective, it turned out to be obligatory issue to identify the borders of the Goodwill Mission of the UN Secretary General through a close look to conceptual foundations of third parties’ initiatives. Within this line, it is considered that demonstration of the beginning and the final points of these borders, their formation process in time, gains and losses of parties during negotiations are necessary. Regarding the methodology of this research, the method of process analysis is mainly applied. Therefore, analytic history has been preferred; rather than traditional method of telling events chronologically. With this method, the features of UN Secretary General’s Mission, analysis of gains and losses from the perspective of parties and the content of UN Resolutions have been examined. The efforts to achieve a peaceful, just and permanent solution in Cyprus within the framework of UN provided a large place for maneuver for both sides. Above all, parties which had directly involved in the Cyprus issue after 1974 had the opportunity to behave more freely. This freedom has raised the violence and the conflicting spaces. This dangerous situation did not only affect Turkish and Greek Cypriots but also led Turkey and Greece to intervene into this issue. The failure of UN to reach “a peaceful solution” from “peaceful deadlock” in Cyprus is especially noteworthy because parties used UN platforms to overwhelm the other party rather than using it to reach a permanent peace in the island. As long as the same situation continues, it is obvious that Secretary Generals like Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan cannot solve this problem easily. From this point, the authority of the Secretary General should be examined from two perspectives. The first one is the question of whether the Secretary General has used his power originated from Security Council for the recognition of the existence of two separate and sovereign communities. The second one is the question of whether the ‘goodwill’ mission of Secretary General has been transformed into BM Genel Sekreteri’nin Kıbrıs’a Yönelik İyi Niyet Misyonu Ve Bununla İlgili Bazı... 717 Turkish Studies International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 10/1 Winter 2015 ‘mediation’, then into ‘arbitration’; and if it is so, how this role has been performed. Indeed, there are many methods to be used in order to solve the matter in Cyprus. However, the political will of both parties’ leaders is the most necessary thing in each and every method because it is not possible to solve the Cyprus issue without a political decision. From this perspective, although arguments that are defended by Turkish side are strong in legal terms, it is difficult to solve through diplomatic means such as mediation and arbitration. However, this method can be sufficient for the solution of the problems in Transitional Government or implementation period when parties reach an agreement politically. When this method is going to be applied, some potential problematic areas are the followings: 1. How will be the interpretation made about the executive power according to the Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus; 2. Will there be a problem of the agreements in accordance with the international law; 3. Will there be a violation of legal framework in the period of the implementation and what kind of precautions have been taken by the parties; 4. How will be necessary operations done for the continuity of the system in Cyprus, which is going to be established. It is a reality that it is not very functional to solve the disputes like in Cyprus through arbitration or legal procedures because the nature of state system and characteristics of the disputes between parties may generate obstacles for the solution. States do not prefer to accept decisions about its problems by other states. In addition, in the process of solution of a problem, they do not approach positively to the legal procedures and frameworks alone since these issues, generally, have political dimensions. For this reason, it is not suitable to compare disagreements between states with those among individuals. The legal solution for individuals means the implementation of law and other legal frameworks, which is a very normal issue in a nation state. On the other hand, it is also possible to defend individuals’ situations and assertions with legal argumentations. However, the current international system does not provide an environment in which interests and values of states are being structured in a hierarchical order and monitored from a central power. For this reason, law can only play a very marginal role in the settlement of inter-states disputes. For this reason, states established international organizations in order to solve their common problems. Although international organizations are weaker than states in many ways, they can manage to achieve certain aims and successes in spite of their limited capacities and authority. In other words, they have become imperious entities in the current international system. For this reason, international organizations have brought new methods and provided certain institutions and negotiation platforms to inter-state relations. 718 Soyalp TAMÇELİK Turkish Studies International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 10/1 Winter 2015 International organizations with political dimension like UN have been accepted by the majority of their member states since they behave according to the principle of sovereignty of the member states. On the other hand decisions, taken by certain organs or the majority of members in supra-national organizations such as EU, are binding for all members. For this reason, the number of states in such organizations is limited. However, the common characteristic of all types of international organizations is their ability to prepare a necessary ground for negotiations and bargains through cooperation with related parties to solve problems. The Cyprus issue is one of these because it is recorded as a political problem in addition to its ethnic, social and legal dimensions. From this perspective, the Cyprus issue is the second biggest unresolved problem in the Eastern Mediterranean after Palestinian issue. However, this issue has some special dimensions when compared to other problems including the Palestinian issue. In other words, the Cyprus issue is not a threat to international peace and security. Cyprus issue, which is just a threat for regional stability and a potential problem in NATO because relevant parties are also members of this international organization, has changed its nature when the EU process has started. Although it is expected from Cyprus, as an EU member, to ensure regional security and stability, it turned out to be a new instability island with the emergence of new controversial subjects such as exploration of new hydrocarbon resources, extraction, sharing and marketing of hydrocarbon. Indeed, all methods implemented by UN and EU are for the settlement of the problem in Cyprus immediately. According to this, the political and diplomatic methods implemented by UN Secretary General for the solution in Cyprus so far can be categorized as the following: The Secretary General have involved into the issue through direct talks with parties in Cyprus, friendly initiatives, being negotiator, investigating and finally being conciliator. However, a new phase has started with Boutros Ghali. This new phase has two main aspects: ‘Arbitration’ and ‘negotiator’. Later, Kofi Annan also applied this method and gained a new mission in the plan by taking an active role through the acquisition of the authority of taking the last decision and ‘writing the necessary provisions’ when the parties cannot agree. However, all the methods implemented until now could not solve the Cyprus problem; on the contrary, they have made the issue more complicated.

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