Corruption and intermediaries -A game theoretical approach

Bu makelenin amacı oyun kuramı kullanılarak "rüşveti alanın" başlattığı bir yolsuzluk eylemini ve bu eylemde aracıların rolünü incelemektir. Verdiği kamu hizmetinden rüşvet almak isteyen ahlak seviyesi düşük bürokrat, hizmeti alan vatandaşları (müşterileri) rüşvet vermeye zorlamak için kırtasiyeciliği artırma gücünü kullanmaktadır. Ancak, rüşvetçi bürokrat kamu hizmetinin müşterilerinden rüşvet istediği zaman, yüksek ahlak seviyesine sahip, kendisininden istenen rüşvet hakkında her zaman hukuki işlem yaptırmayı seçen "idealist" tip bir müşteriden de rüşvet isteme ve deşifre edilip cezalandırılma riski ile karşı karşıyadır. Bu sebeple bürokrat, şikayet edilmek ve ceza almak riskini azaltmak için aracılar vasıtasıyla rüşvet almayı tercih edebilir. Bu makalede aracılı ve aracısız olmak üzere iki yolsuzluk eylemi tipi incelenmiş ve sonuçlan karşılaştırılmıştır. Aracıların olmadığı durumda, bazı şartlar altında riskler o kadar fazla olabilir ki, rüşvetçi bürokratlar bile yolsuzluğa bulaşmamayı tercih edebilir. Ancak, aracıların bulunduğu durumda yakalanma riski çok düşmekte ve rüşvet almak ahlak seviyesi düşük bir bürokrat için neredeyse her zaman karlı olmaktadır. Model sonuçlarına dayanılarak, yolsuzluğu önlemek için alınabilecek tedbirler önerilmektedir.

Yolsuzluk ve aracılar- bir oyun kuramı yaklaşımı

The aim of the article is to examine a bribee-initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Corrupt officers, who want to obtain a bribe from the public services they offer, use their power to increase red tape to enforce clients to pay a bribe. However, if the officer demands a bribe directly from the clients, they face the risk of demanding a bribe from a "whistleblower" client, who has high ethical values and complains to the law enforcement authority about every bribe demand from her. Thus, public officers may prefer using intermediaries to decrease the risk of being complained about and suffering penalties. I examine cases with and without intermediaries in such a scenario and then compare the results of the two. In the case where there is no intermediary, in some situations the risks involved may be so large that the officer may prefer not to demand a bribe. On the other hand, in the cases with intermediaries, the detection risk is reduced, so taking a bribe is nearly always more profitable for the officer. Based on the model’s results, policy suggestions for corruption prevention are made.

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