Normative Power in EU's Democracy Promotion Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment from Zimbabwean and

Bu makale, Zimbabve ve Fildişi Sahili vakalarını kullanarak Normatif Güç Avrupa kavramının kuramsal ve ampirik açıdan sınırlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yaparken ilk olarak Normatif Güç Avrupa kavramını, bu kavrama yönelik liberal yaklaşımları ve neo-realist eleştirileri inceleyerek kuramsallaştıracak; daha sonrasında Cotonou Ortaklık Anlaşması çerçevesine kısaca göz atacak ve son olarak, Avrupa Birliği'nin iki ülkedeki demokrasiyi teşvik etmeye yönelik faaliyetlerini Normatif Güç Avrupa perspektifinden eleştirel olarak inceleyecektir. Makalenin temel savı, normatif vurgunun Cotonou Ortaklık Anlaşması Çerçevesi'nde yerini bulmasına rağmen, stratejik çıkar hesaplarının devamlı olarak Avrupa Birliği'nin normatif amaçlarına baskın çıkması nedeniyle, Avrupa Birliği'nin Zimbabve ve Fildişi Sahili'ndeki siyasi durumlara yönelik tutarsız ve tartışmalı tutumu Avrupa Birliği'nin normatif güç olarak kavramsallaştırılmasını büyük ölçüde sınırlandırmıştır.

Avrupa Birliği'nin Sahra-Altı Afrikası'na Yönelik Demokrasi Teşvik Politikalarında Normatif Güç: Zimbabve ve Fildişi Sahili Vakalar1n1n Eleştirel Değerlendirmesi

This paper seeks to explore the limits of the Normative Power Europe (NPE)'s concept from theoretical and empirical perspectives by using Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast as test case studies. In doing so, it will first theorize the concept of NPE by analyzing the liberal understandings and neorealist critiques of the concept, then it will briefly give an overview of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) framework and finally it will critically examine the EU's democracy promotion activities in both countries from the NPE perspective. Our main argument is that though normative emphasis finds its place in the CPA Framework, the EU's inconsistent and controversial attitude towards the political situation in Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, have significantly limited conceptions of the EU as a normative power because strategic interests calculations have constantly trumped EU's normative aspirations.

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