Quine, the alleged champion of the extreme form of scientific naturalism, has an extremely inclusive conception of science that directly comes from his thoroughgoing pragmatism. His avoidance of prefixing what ontologically permissible entities directly comes from his thoroughgoing empiricism. Even experimental parapsychology or anomalistic psychology by another name is not an oxymoron, although it is highly unlikely. To define, determine, and investigate what is natural falls into the domain of the sciences in the broadest sense. It cannot be foreknown by liberal naturalism, given that no one has the prophetic powers. Thus, it becomes clear that Quine’s scientific naturalism is more liberal than “liberal naturalism.” It is possible that ontological naturalism is the antithesis of methodological naturalism, and the so-called exclusion of some supernatural entities in alleged liberal naturalism in fact renders naturalism too narrow. Contrary to appearances, it might turn out that it is the more restrictive form of naturalism.

Quineci Natüralizm “Liberal Natüralizm”den Daha Kapsayıcıdır

Bilimsel natüralizmin aşırı biçiminin sözde savunucusu olan Quine, tam anlamıyla pragmatizminden doğrudan gelen son derece kapsayıcı bir bilim anlayışına sahiptir. İlk bakışta son derece natüralizme aykırı gibi gözüken varlık iddialarını bile “ontolojik olarak izin verilen varlıklar” olarak değerlendirip, onları önsel olarak reddetmekten kaçınması, doğrudan onun kapsamlı ampirizminden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bilimsel parapsikoloji veya başka bir adla anomalistik psikoloji bile, pek olası olmasa da bir oksimoron değildir. Doğal olanı tanımlamak, belirlemek ve araştırmak en geniş anlamda bilimlerin alanına girer. Hiç kimsenin kehanet gücüne sahip olmadığı göz önüne alındığında, neyin doğal olduğu liberal natüralizm tarafından önceden bilinemez. Böylece Quine’ın bilimsel natüralizminin “liberal natüralizm”den daha liberal olduğu ortaya çıkıyor. Ontolojik natüralizmin metodolojik natüralizmin antitezi olması muhtemeldir ve sözde liberal natüralizmde bazı doğaüstü varlıkların sözde dışlanması, aslında natüralizmi çok dar kılmaktadır. Görünenin aksine, onun natüralizmin daha kısıtlayıcı biçimi olduğu ortaya çıkabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Natüralizm, Liberal Natüralizm, Bilimsel Natüralizm, Yöntemsel Natüralizm, Ontolojik Natüralizm.

Quine’s Naturalism is More Inclusive Than “Liberal Naturalism”

Keywords:

Naturalism, Liberal naturalism, Scientific Naturalism, Methodological Naturalism, Ontological Naturalism.,

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