The metaethical view that asserts the nonexistence of objective moral values and duties is known as moral nihilism. The fundamental claim of moral nihilism pertains to ontology. However, numerous linguistic metaethical theories reject moral ontology and thereby fall within the scope of moral nihilism in the ontological context. Nevertheless, due to the notorious connotation of nihilism, philosophers often refrain from explicitly labeling their advocated theories as moral nihilism, despite sharing many similarities. In this study, both what moral nihilism is and an examination of its scope have been presented. My proposition is that all non-cognitivist metaethical theories, with the exception of error theory accompanied by cognitivism, should be classified under the framework of moral nihilism. To support this, non-cognitivist linguistic theories such as emotivism, expressivism, quasi-realism, and prescriptivism, along with ontological theories like moral subjectivism and moral relativism, have been examined under separate titles. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that all of these mentioned theories are fundamentally moral nihilist. Although in the literature, moral nihilism is often associated with error theory, the study emphasizes that the scope of moral nihilism is much broader. This is because all the aforementioned metaethical theories reject moral ontology.

Ahlaki Nihilizm Kapsamına Giren Metaetik Teoriler

Objektif ahlaki değerlerin ve görevlerin var olmadığını savunan metaetik görüş ahlaki nihilizmdir. Yani ahlaki nihilizmin esas iddiası ontoloji üzerinedir. Bununla birlikte, birçok linguistik metaetik teori ahlaki ontolojiyi reddetmekte ve dolayısıyla ontolojik bağlamda ahlaki nihilizm kapsamına girmektedir. Fakat nihilizmin kötü şöhretli bir kelime olmasından dolayı filozoflar genellikle savundukları teorilerin, tüm benzerliklerine rağmen, ahlaki nihilist olduğunu dillendirmemektedirler. Bu çalışmada hem ahlaki nihilizmin ne olduğu anlatılmış hem de onun kapsamına dair bir inceleme yapılmıştır. İddiam, tüm gayrıbilişselci metaetik teorilerin ve bilişselciliğiyle istisna olan hata teorisinin ahlaki nihilizm çatısı altında sınıflandırılması gerektiğidir. Bunun için duyguculuk, dışavurumculuk, yarı realizm, kuralcılık gibi gayrıbilişselci linguistik teoriler ve ahlaki sübjektivizm, ahlaki görelilik gibi ontolojik teoriler ayrı başlıklarda incelenmiştir. Sözü edilen tüm bu teorilerin esasen ahlaki nihilist olduğu gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Literatürde ahlaki nihilizm her ne kadar daha çok hata teorisi ile özdeşleşmiş olsa da, ahlaki nihilizmin kapsamının çok daha geniş olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Zira sözü edilen metaetik teorilerin tamamı ahlaki ontolojiyi reddetmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Ahlaki nihilizm, metaetik, duyguculuk, dışavurumculuk, gayrıbilişselcilik, hata teorisi.

Metaethical Theories Falling Within The Scope of Moral Nihilism

Keywords:

Moral nihilism, metaethics, emotivism, expressivism, non-cognitivism, error theory.,

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