forlorn solitude, in which I am placed in my philosophy. –I have exposed my self to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians. –I have declared my disapprobations of their systems. –When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; though such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. –Can I be sure, that, in leaving all established opinions, I am following truth? And by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if Fortune should at last guide me on her footsteps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I should assent to it, and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view under which they appear to me. –The memory, senses, and understanding, are all of them founded on the imagination. –No wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious should lead us into errors, when implicitly followed (as it must be) in all its variations. –I have already shown, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition either in philosophy or common life. – We have no choice left, but betwixt a false reason and none at all. –Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? On whom have I any infuence, or who have any infuence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty. –If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. –In all the incidents of life, we ought still to preserve our scepticism: If we believe that fire warms, or water refreshes, ’tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise; nay, if we are philosophers, it ought only to be on sceptical principles. –I cannot forebear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of Moral good and evil,etc. I am concerned for the condition of the learned world, which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. –Should I endeavour to banish these sentiments, I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.’