Coliss Lamont'ta "Seçme Özgürlüğü ve Belirlenimcilik" Problemi 1

Bu makalede Corliss Lamont’un özgürlükçü yaklaşımı betimlenip çözüm-lenmektedir. Doğalcı bir filozof olarak Lamont, seçme özgürlüğünün, yekpare, monist ve dolayısıyla da belirlenmiş bir evrende değil, ancak potansiyellik, bireysellik ve olumsallıkla dolu çoğulcu bir evrende mümkün olduğunu öne sürer. Bir kanıt formunda ifade etmeye çalıştığım ana akıl yürütmesi temelinde katı ve ılımlı belirlenimciliğe itiraz eden Lamont, seçme özgürlüğünü pozitif/kategorik bir özgürlük olarak tanımladığı için, bir öz-belirlenimcilik teorisini savunmakta ve onu bir tür bağdaşırcı açıklama olarak sunmaktadır. Bu makalede haklı olduğunu düşündüğüm yerlerde Lamont’u desteklemekte, fakat böyle düşünmediğim yerlerde de eleştirmekteyim. Bunu yaparken sonuç bölümünde Thomas W. Clark’ın Lamont’un özgürlükçülüğüne yönelttiği itirazlara da başvuruyorum. Bununla birlikte bana göre, Clark, Lamont’un bazı düşüncelerini yanlış anla-makta ve hatta bazı noktalarda Lamont’un kendi ifadelerini yanlış okumaktadır; fakat Clark’ın Lamont’un kaçınmaya çalıştığı düalizme düşme gibi bir sorunu olduğu şeklindeki ana itirazına da kısmen katılıyorum. Son noktada, Lamont’un öz-belirlenimcilik teorisinin kendi doğası gereği bazı güçlükleri olduğunu iddia ediyorum: Lamont ya kaçınmaya çalıştığı düalizmi kabul etmelidir ya da seçme özgürlüğünü ancak ileride beynin gizeminin bilimsel keşfiyle açıklanması beklenilen seküler bir “kanaat” olarak bırakmalıdır. Lamont’a gelince, o, bu ya-ya da seçeneğinden ikincisini “seçiyor”.

The Problem of "Determinism and Freedom of Choice" in Lamont

In this paper, I first describe and then analyze Corliss Lamont's libertarian approach. He as a naturalist philosopher maintains that freedom of choice is possible only in a pluralistic universe which is full of potentiality, individuality and contingecy, not in a monolithic, monist, and determined universe. On the basis of his main reasoning, which I try to put it into the form of an argument, he objects to hard and soft determinism. Since he defines the freedom of choice as a positive/categoric freedom, he defends a theory of self-determination and presents it as a kind of compatibilist explanation. In the paper, I support his ideas where I think he is right, but also criticize him where I think he is not right. In doing so, I refer to T. W. Clark's objections to Lamont's libertarianism at the concluding section. In my opinion, however, Clark misunderstands Lamont's some ideas and even misreads his own utterances, but I partly agree with Clark's main objection that Lamont has a trouble with dualism which he attempts to avoid. At the last point, I argue that Lamont’s theory of self-determination has some difficulties by its own nature: Either he must accept dualism which he tries to keep it away from his theory or he must leave the freedom of choice a secular “opinion” expected to be all explained only through the scientific discovery of the mystery of the brain in the future. As for Lamont, he “chooses” the second of the either-or options.

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