ATILIMCILARIN BİLİŞSEL DÜZEYLERİNE GÖRE TÜRKİYE’NİN AB ÜYELİĞİNİN TEMEL BELİRLEYİCİLERİ

Bu makalede, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine yönelik kamuoyu desteğinin unsurları incelenmektedir. Çalışmada kullanılan veriler 2010-2018 dönemindeki dokuz yıla ait Eurobarometer anketlerinden elde edilmiştir. Sadece birkaç yılı kapsayan önceki çalışmalarda olduğunun aksine, bu çalışmada neredeyse on yıla yakın bir döneme ait kamuoyu tutumları kapsama alınmıştır. Ayrıca, yine bu çalışmada, öncekilerden farklı olarak, tutum belirleyicilerinin etkileri, katılımcıların AB farkındalık düzeyleri bakımından ele alınmıştır. Bulgular, akademik yazının paralelinde, bütünleşmeye destek konusunda en güçlü belirleyicinin “beklenen fayda” olduğunu ve “kültürel kimliğinin kaybolacağı korkusunun” bütünleşme üzerinde anlamlı ve negatif bir etkisinin bulunduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak, benzer çalışmalardan farklı olarak, bulgular, katılımcıların biliş düzeyleri yükseldikçe, bu etkinin istatistiksel olarak anlamlı olmayacak bir düzeye indiğini ortaya koymuştur. Tersine, “beklenen fayda” ve “AB’ye güven” değişkenlerinin, katılımcıların biliş düzeyi arttıkça yükseldiği görülmüştür. Yaş, cinsiyet, hükümete güven faktörleriyle bağımlı değişken arasında herhangi bir ilişki saptanmamıştır.

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP WITH RESPECT TO COGNITIVE LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS

In this paper, basic determinants of public support for Turkey’s EU membership were analyzed. The datautilized for the study was obtained from Eurobarometer Surveys, and covered a period of nine years, from 2010to 2018. Unlike earlier studies in which the data was usually collected within a span of a few years, this study,however, consisted of a public opinion aggregate that stretched up to almost a decade. Besides, different fromprevious studies, in this, effects of determinants were investigated with respect to EU-awareness level of therespondents. Our findings suggest, in line with literature, that the strongest determinant regarding support forintegration, was found to be the “expected benefit”, and that the factor “fear of loss of cultural identity” seemedto have a meaningful and negative impact on support for EU membership. However, different from similarstudies, the findings do suggest that, as respondents’ cognitive level increased, the effects of “loss of culturalidentity” on public support decreased to a level where it became statistically insignificant. On the contrary, theimpacts of “expected benefit” and “trust in the EU” variables were detected to increase as the cognitive level ofrespondents rises. No meaningful relationship was observed between the factors of “age-gender-trust ingovernment” and the dependent variable.

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