Seçmen Davranışları ile Ekonomik Performans Arasındaki İlişkilerin Teorik Temelleri ve Türkiye Üzerine Genel Bir Değerlendirme

Gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde siyasal iktidarın belirlenmesinde seçmen davranışı en önemli faktördür. İktisat Teorisinde siyaset - ekonomi ilişkilerini irdeleyen araştırmaların önemli bir bölümüne göre seçmen davranışları kişisel çıkar güdüsü ile belirlenir. Buna göre siyasal iktidarların cari ve geçmiş dönem performanslarını degerlendiren seçmenler kendilerine en çok fayda saglayan ve temel iktisadi sorunların üslesinden gelebilen partilere oy verirler. Bu çalışmanın amacı seçmen davranışı ile ekonomik performans arasındaki ilişkilerin teorik temellerini analiz etmek ve konuyu Türkiye özelinde incelemektir.

Theoretical Foundation of the Relation Between Voter Behavior and Economic Performance: A General Assessment on Turkey

in developed and developing countries voter behavior is the most important factor for the determination of political power. According to the literature on economic theory which investigates the relationship between politics and economic, voter behavior is determined by the personal benetit motive. According to this result, voters who are evaluating current and past performances of the political power, give their votes to the most beneticial political party. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between voter beha vior and economic perforrnances on a theoretical basis and examine this subject in reference to Turkey.

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