KUŞAK ve YOL GİRİŞİMİNİN FİNANSMANI: ÇİN’İN BORÇ TUZAĞI MI?

Çin’in 21. yüzyıldaki en büyük altyapı yatırım girişimi olan Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi (KYG), Çin devlet kapitalizmi modelinin uluslararasında bir yatırım modeline dönüştürülmesinin ilk nüvesidir. Girişimin devlet-destekli yatırım girişimi olarak adlandırılmasına yol açan en önemli sebep, girişimdeki projelerin finansmanının Çin devlet ticari ve politika bankaları ve ulusal varlık fonları tarafından sağlanmasıdır. Fakat altyapı finansmanının ülke garantili tercihli krediler yoluyla sağlanması özellikle az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerin borçlarını ödeyememeleri durumunda Çin kamu teşebbüsleriyle borç-öz sermaye takası anlaşmaları yapmalarına yol açmaktadır. Çin’in stratejik noktaları ele geçirmek için küçük ekonomileri bilinçli bir şekilde aşırı KYG borçlanmasına itmesi olarak tanımlanan borç tuzağı, KYG’nin aslında siyasi bir proje olduğu tartışmalarının merkezinde yer almaktadır. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle bankalar ve ulusal varlık fonlarının analiziyle Çin’in devlet sermayesini KYG finansmanına nasıl aktardığı ele alınacaktır. Ardından borç sıkıntına düşen ülkelerdeki projelerin Çin için stratejik bir önem arz edip etmediği analiz edilecektir.

FINANCING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: CHINA’S DEBT TRAP?

The Belt and Road Initiative, China's largest infrastructure investment initiative in the 21st Century, is the first core of the transformation of the Chinese state capitalism model into an international investment model. The most important reason that led the initiative to be called a state-driven investment initiative is that the financing of projects in the initiative is provided by Chinese state-owned commercial and policy banks and sovereign wealth funds. However, the provision of infrastructure financing through sovereign-guaranteed preferential loans leads to debt-equity swap agreements with Chinese state-owned enterprises, particularly if underdeveloped and developing countries are unable to pay their debts. The debt trap, defined as China consciously pushing small economies into excessive BRI borrowing to seize strategic assets, is at the center of discussions that BRI is a political project. This study will focus primarily on how China transfers state capital to BRI financing through analysis of state-owned banks and sovereign wealth funds. It will then be analyzed whether projects in debt-distressed countries are of strategic importance to China.

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