Orta Doğu’da Rusya-İran İttifakı: İkili Güvenlik İşbirliğinin Temel Dinamikleri ve Sınırları

Bu makale, Rusya-İran ittifakının temel dinamiklerini incelemekte ve bu ittifakın Rus dış politikası ve Rusya'nın ABD'ye karşı izlediği dengeleme stratejisinde nasıl bir rol oynadığını tartışmaktadır. Orta Doğu bölgesinde Rusya belli bir devleti daimi müttefik olarak benimsemekten kaçınmakta ve tüm bölge ülkeleriyle ortak çıkarlar çerçevesinde pragmatik işbirliği geliştirmeye çalışmaktadır. 1990’lardan bu yana Tahran ile bölgesel güvenlik konularında yakın işbirliği sürdüren Rusya, İran'la uzun vadeli ve bağlayıcı bir askeri ittifak düzenlemesine dahil olmaktan kaçınmıştır. Bunun yerine Moskova’nın İran’la ilişkilerini ABD karşısında pazarlık kozu olarak kullandığı ve Rusya-Amerika ilişkilerinde herhangi bir yakınlaşma olduğunda kendini Tahran'dan uzaklaştırdığı görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Rusya-İran ittifakı, askeri ittifaklara ve ortak silahlanma girişimlerine dayanan ve rakip bir devlete doğrudan meydan okumayı amaçlayan ‘sert dengeleme’ örneği teşkil etmemektedir. Rusya-İran güvenlik işbirliği, gayri-resmi ittifaklar ve kısıtlı düzeyde silahlanma gibi daha az çatışmacı yöntemlere dayanan ve sadece rakip devletin tehditkâr davranışlarını sınırlamayı amaçlayan bir ‘yumuşak dengeleme’ girişimi olarak tanımlanmalıdır. Rusya'nın ABD karşısında başvurduğu yumuşak dengeleme stratejisinin yanında, Rusya-İran ittifak ilişkileri ikinci bir önemli kısıtlayıcı faktörle karşı karşıya kalmaktadır. Rusya, İran’ı desteklemek pahasına İsrail ve Körfez ülkeleri gibi diğer bölgesel aktörlerle ilişkilerini riske atmak istememekte ve bu devletlerle dış politika, enerji ve savunma sanayi gibi konularda işbirliği potansiyelini değerlendirmeye çalışmaktadır.

The Russia-Iran Alignment in the Middle East: The Main Dynamics and Limits of the Bilateral Security Cooperation

This article examines the main dynamics of the Russia-Iran alignment and discusses its significance in Russian foreign policy and Russia’s balancing strategy against the US. In the Middle East, Russia does not embrace an individual state as a constant ally and seeks pragmatic cooperation with all regional states. Despite maintaining close cooperation with Tehran since the 1990s, Russia has avoided building long-term and binding alliance arrangements with Iran. Instead, Moscow has utilized its relations with Iran as bargaining chip vis-à-vis the US and distanced itself from Tehran whenever there has been a rapprochement in Russian-American relations. In this regard, the Russia-Iran alignment is not an example of ‘hard balancing’ that draws on military alliance formation and mutual arms build-up and aims at confrontation with an adversary. It can be best identified as a ‘soft balancing’ initiative that relies on less confrontational methods such as informal alignments and limited arms build-up and aims to restrain the threatening behavior of a rival state. Another significant limitation of Russia-Iran alignment is that Russia is unwilling to risk its relations with Israel and Gulf states for the sake of Iran considering the cooperation potential with those states in foreign policy, energy, and arms industry.

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