TİCARİ AÇIKLIK ÜZERİNDE TARİFLERİN KARMAŞIKLIK DÜZEYİNİN ETKİLERİNİN BİR ANALİZ

Devletlerin, ekonomik, politik ve sosyal nedenlerden dolayı uluslararası ticarete müdahale etmesi gerekebilir. Bu çalışmada, tarifelerin uluslararası ticaret üzerindeki etkileri istatistiksel teknikler kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Test sonuçlarına göre, orta ve yüksek düzeyde tarife karmaşıklığına sahip ülkeler için ticari açıklık ortalaması eşittir. Öte yandan, tarife karmaşıklık düzeyi düşük olan ülkeler için dış ticaret açıklık puanı ortalaması, tarife karmaşıklığı orta ve yüksek olan ticari açıklık puanına sahip ülkelerden istatistiksel olarak daha yüksektir. Sonuç olarak, tarifelerin karmaşıklık seviyesinin, ticari açıklığı olumsuz yönde etkilediği, bunun uluslararası ticaret politikası tasarlanırken göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiği sonucuna varılabilir.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF COMPLEXITY LEVEL OF THE TARIFFS ON TRADE OPENNES

States may need to intervene in international trade for economic, political and socialreasons. In this study, the effects of tariffs on international trade were investigatedby using statistical techniques. According to the test results, the average of tradeopenness for countries with medium and high tariff complexity is equal. On the otherhand, for countries with low tariff complexity, the average of trade openness scoreis statistically higher than those with a commercially clear score of middle and hightariff complexity. As a result, it can be concluded that the level of complexity of tariffsadversely affects trade openness, which should be taken into account when designinginternational trade policy.

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