Para Politikası ve Ücret Pazarlıkçıları Arasındaki Stratejik Etkileşimin Makroekonomik Performans Üzerindeki Etkisi

Para Politikası ve Ücret Pazarlıkçıları Arasındaki Stratejik Etkileşimin Makroekonomik Performans Üzerindeki EtkisiMerkez bankası ve diğer ekonomik aktörler arasındaki sinyalleşme mekanizmasında ücret pazarlığının kurumsal yapısı önemli rol oynamaktadır. Ücret pazarlığının koordinasyon derecesi merkez bankası tarafından gönderilen sinyalleri daha etkin hale getirir ve bağımsız bir merkez bankasının ekonomiye herhangi bir reel maliyet (işsizlik vb) yüklemeden enfl asyonu düşürmesine yardım eder. Daha açık ifade edilecek olursa, ücret pazarlığı koordinasyon seviyesi yüksek olduğunda, enfl asyon ile mücadele etmek zorunda olan bağımsız bir merkez bankası istihdam seviyesini düşürmek zorunda kalmadan enfl asyon hedeŞ ni gerçekleştirebilmektedir. Buna karşın, düşük koordinasyon derecelerinde enfl asyon ile mücadelede işsizlik gibi reel bir maliyeti beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, merkez bankası bağımsızlığının ve ücret pazarlığı koordinasyon derecesinin ve bu iki kurumsal değişkenin (merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve ücret pazarlığı koordinasyon derecesi) etkileşiminin işsizlik üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktır. Çalışmada sistem GMM yöntemiyle ulaşılan sonuçlar, bağımsız bir merkez bankası ve koordineli pazarlıkçıları arasındaki etkileşimin işsizlik üzerinde azaltıcı bir etki meydana getirdiğine işaret etmektedir. Diğer taraftan, birincil amacı Ş yat istikrarı olan bağımsız bir merkez bankası genel olarak işsizliği artıcı bir etki meydana getirmesine rağmen, işsizlik oranı üzerinde meydana gelecek net etki, ücret pazarlığı koordinasyon derecesine bağlı olmaktadır.

The Impact of the Strategic Interaction among Monetary Policy and Wage Bargainers on Macroeconomic Performance

The instutional structure of wage bargaining plays an important role in the signalling mechanism amongst central bank and other economic actors. Wage bargaining coordination degree makes the signals sent by central banks more effective and helps an independent central bank to reduce infl ation without charging a real cost (unemployment etc.) on the economy. More clearly, when wage bargaining coordination degree is high, an independent central bank having to combat with infl ation could reach its infl ation target without having to reduce the level of employment . None the less, when coordination degree is low, combating with infl ation brings about an real cost such as unemployment. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of central bank independence, wage bargaining coordination and the interaction of these two institutional variables on unemployment. According to system GMM test results, the study reveals that the interaction between central bank independence and wage bargainer generates an reducing effect on unemployment. In addition, although an independent central bank whose primary objective is price stability generally causes increase in unemployment, the net effect depends on wage bargaining coordination level.

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