Kurumlar ve Ekonomik Performans İlişkisi: Teorik Çerçeve

Bu çalışmada kurumlar ve ekonomik performans ilişkisi teorik açıdan ele alınmıştır. Son dönem literatürüne göre kurumlar, ülkelerin ekonomik büyüme farklılıklarının temel nedeni olarak kabul edilmektedir. Literatüre göre, ekonomik refahı artıran iyi kurumlar temelde 3 başlık altında incelenebilir: Mülkiyet haklarının uygulanabilir olması, politikacılar ve diğer güçlü grupların kısıtlanması ve fırsat eşitliğinin sağlanması. Çalışmamızda daha geniş bir şekilde bu ilişkiyi belirleyen temel karakteristikler mülkiyet hakları, yasal sistem-hukukun üstünlüğü ile hükümetin yapısı ve demokrasi başlıkları altında detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Büyümenin sağlanması için güvenilir bir mülkiyet hakkına ihtiyaç vardır. İkinci olarak, hukukun üstünlüğü söz konusu değilse, bağımsız yargıdan bahsedilemeyecek ve sözleşmeden doğan haklar yerine getirilemeyecektir. Yatırımlar ve büyüme bu durumdan negatif etkilenecektir. Üçüncü başlıkta, demokrasi-büyüme çalışmalarına ilişkin sonuçlar farklı neticelenmektedir. Literatürde yapılan çalışmalar, karşılaştırmalı olarak demokrasi ve otokrasiden hangisinin büyüme üzerinde daha olumlu sonuçlar verdiği noktasındadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Kurumlar, Ekonomik Performans, Hukukun Üstünlüğü, Demokrasi, Mülkiyet hakları, Demokrasi

The Relationship Between Institutions and Economic Performance: Theoretical Framework

In this study, the relationship between institutions and economic performance is theoretically addressed. According to the recent literature, institutions are regarded as the main cause of economic growth differences in countries. According to the literature, good institutions that improve economic welfare can be examined under three headings: the applicability of property rights, the restriction of politicians and other strong groups and the equality of opportunity. In our study, the fundamental characteristics that determine this relationship are examined under the title of property rights, legal system-the rule of law and the government structure and democracy in a broader way. Secondly, if the rule of law is not in question, the rights arising from the independent judiciary shall not work properly and the contract will be unfulfilled.. Investments and growth will be negatively affected by this situation. In the third title, the conclusions of democracy-growth are different. The studies in the literature are at the point where the democracy and the autocracy have more positive results on growth comparatively.

Keywords:

Institutions, Economic Performance, Property Rights, Rule of Law, Democracy, Democracy,

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