Hilal YILMAZ

2014

Leniency programmes

Kartellerle mücadele, rekabet otoritelerinin en önemli görevlerinden biridir. Rekabet otoritelerinin kartelleri yıkma çabalarına rağmen, hala karteller kurulmaya ve işlemeye devam etmektedir. Zira, kartellerin gizli yapısı, tespit edilmesi, ispatlanması ve kovuşturması için yeterince delil bulmaya daha fazla yetki gerektirmesi nedeniyle kartellerle mücadele çok zorlu bir görevdir. Bu nedenle pişmanlık programları, kartelleri yıkmakta gittikçe daha önemli hale gelmektedir. Bu makalenin amacı, dünyada pekçok hukuk düzeninde kullanılan pişmanlık programlarını araştırmak ve pişmanlık programları neden gereklidir, nasıl çalışır, önkoşulları nelerdir gibi konuları açıklamaktır. Makale şu bölümlerden oluşmaktadır: 1. bölüm karteller ve kartel politikasına ilişkin bir giriş sağlayacaktır. İkinci bölümde pişmanlık programı uygulamanın sebepleri tartışılacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde ise pişmanlık programının çalışma mekanizması ele alınacaktır. Dördüncü bölümde başarılı bir pişmanlık programının ön koşulları ortaya konacak ve beşinci bölümde makale sonuçlandırılacaktır.

Pişmanlık programları

The fight against cartels is one of the most important tasks of competition agencies. Although competition agencies (CAs) continue to increase their efforts to break down cartels, they have still continued to form and operate. Because the fight against cartels is a challenging task due to their secret nature, more powers are required to gather enough evidence to detect, prove and prosecute infringement. That is why leniency programs, which have a complex nature, are clearly becoming increasingly important to breaking down cartels. The purpose of this article is survey the basis for leniency programs which have been used in several jurisdictions around the world and explain why the leniency programs are necessary, how they work, what their prerequisites are. The article is structured in the following way: Section 1 provides an introduction to the cartels and aim of cartel policy. Section 2 discusses the reasons to implement a leniency programme. Section 3 discusses the mechanisms of leniency programme to work Section 4 puts forward the pre-requisites of a successful leniency programme and section 5 concludes.
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Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 5 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
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