Tersine Dönmüş İki Seviyeli Bir Oyun Olarak Suriye Krizi

Bağlantı politikaları farklı analiz seviyeleri arasındaki bağlara odakla¬nır. Putnam'ın iki seviyeli oyun modeli özellikle iç politikadan doğan kısıtlamaların uluslararası görüşmelere etkisine odaklanır. Bu tür görüş¬melerde bir aktörün başarısı ortaya çıkan anlaşma ve bu anlaşmanın iki tarafça onaylanarak yürürlüğe girmesiyle ölçülür. Bunun mümkün olması için farklı seviyelerdeki aktörlerin çıkarlarının örtüşmesi ve bir anlaşma yapmayı anlaşmadan görüşmeleri sonlandırmaya tercih et¬meleri gerekir. Bu çalışmada ben de benzer bir sürece bakıyorum. Bir fark modelin ters çevrilmesiyle Suriye'de görüşmelerin iç politikadaki rakipler arasında, onayın ise bu aktörlerin uluslararası müttefiklerinden gelecek olması. Suriye krizi örneğinden hareketle aktörlerin konumla¬rını ve yakın gelecekte barışçı bir çözüm olasılığını değerlendiriyorum.

Syrian Crisis as a Reversed Two-Level Game

Linkage politics focuses on the ties between different levels of analy¬sis. Putnam's two-level game model specifically focuses on the impact of domestic constraints over international negotiations. In such nego¬tiations the success of an actor is determined by the agreement that is reached and that the agreement is ratified by both sides, putting it into effect. In order for that to happen actors at different levels of analyses need to have overlapping interests and they must prefer an agreement to no agreement. In this study I look at a similar process. One differ-ence is that in Syria the negotiations take place between domestic opponents and a potential agreement is ratified by their international allies, turning the model upside-down. Using the Syrian crisis as an example I evaluate the positions adopted by the actors involved and the potential of a peaceful resolution in the near future.

Keywords:

Two-Level Games, Ba'th:Syria, Uprising Opposition,

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