Cenker Korhan DEMİR

5421

ORDULAR ARAP AYAKLANMALARINA NEDEN FARKLI TEPKİ VERDİLER? SİLAHLI KUVVETLERİN KARARINI ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER

Tunus’la başlayan ve daha önce tahmin edilemeyen bir hızda ve yoğunlukta yayılan ayaklanmalar, çok geçmeden neredeyse bütün Arap devletlerini etkisi altına almıştır. Bu kitlesel karışıklıklar her birinde kendine özgü şekilde yaşanmış ve etkileri halen yaşanmaya devam etmektedir. Öte yandan, bu ayaklanmaları bastırmakla ilgili emir alan silahlı kuvvetler emrin gereğini yapmaktan, emirlere itaat etmemeye kadar değişen biçimlerde tepkiler göstermişlerdir. Bu makalenin temel amacı, önceki çalışmaların bıraktığı boşluğun doldurulmasını hedefleyerek, yönetimlerde kurumsallaşma ve ordularda profesyonelleşmenin kitlesel ayaklanmalarla karşılaşan askerlerin müdahale etme yönünde emir aldıklarında gösterecekleri reaksiyona nasıl etkide bulunduklarını araştırmaktır. İki değişkenin birleşik etkisi Tunus, Mısır, Libya, Yemen ve Suriye örnekleri üzerinde incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın önemli bulgularından birisi, kitlesel ayaklanmalarla karşılaşan orduların müdahale etme yönünde kararlarına ve bu müdahalenin nasıl sonuçlanacağına yönetimde kurumsallaşma ve orduların profesyonelleşme düzeylerinin birleşik olarak etkisinin, ikisinin tek başına etkisinden daha önemli olduğu yönündedir
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Kurumsallaşma, Profesyonelleşme, Arap Ayaklanmaları, Silahlı Kuvvetler, Sivil Asker İlişkileri.

WHY ARMIES REACTED DIFFERENTLY TO THE ARAB UPRISINGS? DYNAMICS AFFECTING THE DECISION OF MILITARY

The uprisings, which began in Tunisia, have spread at a rapid pace and with an unprecedented intensity. These uprisings have influenced all Arab countries in a variety of ways, followed particular pathways and ended differently. However, the reactions of armies to the orders of their respective governments have varied from loyalty to defection. This paper aims to examine the reciprocal and combined effect of government and military institutions on the issue. The qualitative method with some quantitative figures has been used. The effects of institutionalization of governments and the professionalization of armies have been studied in this article along with the consequences of uprisings in five separate cases: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. It is found that while instability has indeed occurred at different levels in all of these cases, the interaction of the institutionalization of government and the professionalization of the military have played decisive effects more than the effect of each one on the reaction of armies
Keywords:

Institutionalism, Professionalism, Arab Uprising, Armed Forces, Civil Military Relations,

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  • ISSN: 1309-1557
  • Başlangıç: 2009
  • Yayıncı: ORTADOĞU ARAŞTIRMALARI DERNEĞİ
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