Yönetim güçlendirmenin firmanın finansal performansı ve risk alma davranışı üzerindeki etkisi

Çalışmanın temel amacı, yönetim güçlendirmenin hem firmanın finansal performansını hem de risk alma davranışını nasıl ve ne yönde etkilediği sorusuna gelişmekte olan ülke bağlamının yaratacağı farklılıklar göz önüne alınarak yanıt aramaktır. Vekalet kuramı ve temsil teorisi çerçevesinde geliştirilen araştırma hipotezleri 336 firmadan elde edilen ikincil veriler ışığında, bir dizi kontrol değişkeni de göz önüne alınarak, hiyerarşik regresyon analizi ile test edilmiştir. Analiz sonuçları, güçlendirilmiş yönetimin firmanın finansal performansını ve risk alma davranışını farklı düzeylerde ve farklı yönlerde etkilediğine işaret etmektedir. Bulgular bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Türkiye bağlamında yönetim güçlendirme ile örgütsel sonuçlar arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamada temsil teorisi bakış açısının, vekalet kuramına kıyasla, daha baskın olduğu görülmektedir.

The effects of management entrenchment on financial performance and risktaking behaviour of firms

The aim of this study is to examine how and which direction the management entrenchment affects both financial performance and risk-taking of firms from the point of view of emerging markets. The hypotheses developed in light of agency theory and stewardship theory are tested using secondary data drawn from 336 firms and through hierarchial analyses in which a series of the moderating variables are taken into account. The results of analysis show that management entrenchment affects financial performance and risk-taking behavior at different levels and various dimensions. When the findings are completely evaluated it can clearly be seen that the relationship between management entrenchment and organizational outputs is explained from the point of view of stewardship theory rather than agency theory

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ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1010-9935
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2018
  • Yayıncı: ODTÜ İİBF