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The effects of outside options on optimal auction outcomes

Bu makalede, enformasyonel dışsallıklar içeren ihale tasarımı problemleri için satıcı-optimal ihale kuralları tanımlanmaktadır ve dış seçeneklerin bu ihale kuralları sonuçları üzerine olan etkisi incelenmektedir. Eğer satıcının dış seçeneği içsel ve piyasanın enformasyon durumuna bağlı ise, ihale standart özel-değer ihale ortamına yaklaştıkça satıcının ihale edilen malı daha sık sattığı gösterilmektedir. Eğer satıcının dış seçeneği piyasanın enformasyon durumuna bağlı değil ise, enformasyonel dışsallık derecesi ile satış kararları arasındaki bağlantı belirsizdir

Dış seçeneklerin optimal ihale sonuçlarına etkisi

In this paper, we study the seller-optimal auctions for auction design environments with pure informational externalities, and investigate the effects of outside options on auction outcomes. If the seller's outside option is endogenous and depends on the information structure of the market, we show that the seller sells the good more often as the auction design environment merges into the standard private-value auction setting. If the seller's outside option does not depend on the information structure of the market, we show that the relationship between the degree of informational externalities and sale decisions in seller-optimal auctions is ambiguous. Keywords: Auction design, informational externalities, outside options.
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ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1010-9935
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2018
  • Yayıncı: ODTÜ İİBF
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