Staff rotation, connection building and intermediaries in corrupt transactions
Yolsuzluk tarih boyunca pek çok toplumda önemli bir sorun olagelmiştir. Yolsuzluğu caydırma yolları konusunda geniş bir literatür bulunmaktadır; personel rotasyonu bu yollardan biridir. Bu makale temelde, personel rotasyonunun yolsuzluk üzerine etkilerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, kamu görevlileri ile bağlantı kurmak ve aracılar gibi yolsuzluğu kolaylaştıran diğer faktörlerin etkisi de göz önünde bulundurulmaktadır. Personel rotasyonunun, bağlantı kurmanın ve aracıların rolleri üç farklı senaryoda ele alınmıştır: aracıların bulunmadığı tek sefer oynanan bir oyun, aracıların bulunmadığı sonsuz tekrarlanan bir oyun ve aracıların bulunduğu bir oyun. Model sonuçları, personel rotasyonunun, cezaların artırılmasının ve kamunun temiz bir imajının olmasının etkili yolsuzluk karşıtı politika araçları olduğunu göstermektedir. Aracıların var olması veya kamu görevlilieri ile vatandaşların uzun vadeli bir ilişki içinde olmaları zaman tutarsızlığı sorunlarını çözmekte ve böylece, öncesinde gerçekleştirilemeyen yolsuzluklar gerçekleştirilebilir hale gelmektedir. JEL Sınıflaması: K42, C72, D73.
Yolsuzluklarda personel rotasyonunun, bağlantı kurmanın ve aracıların etkisi
Corruption has been a major problem in many societies throughout history. There is an extensive literature about the ways to discourage corruption, with staff rotation being one of the suggestions given. This article primarily focuses on the effect of staff rotation on corrupt transactions, although it also considers other factors, like connection building and use of intermediaries, which facilitate corrupt transactions. The roles of staff rotation, connection building and intermediaries are examined in three different settings: a stage game without intermediaries, an infinitely repeated game without intermediaries, and a game with intermediaries. Results suggest that staff rotation, increased penalties and a clean image of public office can be effective anti-corruption policy tools. Existence of intermediaries or a long term interaction between officers and the clients can solve time inconsistencies, thus, some corrupt transactions, which are not implementable otherwise, become feasible. JEL Classification: K42, C72, D73.
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- ISSN: 1010-9935
- Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
- Başlangıç: 2018
- Yayıncı: ODTÜ İİBF
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