İÇERİDEN ÖĞRENENLER TİCARETİNE YAKLAŞIMLAR

İçeriden öğrenenler ticareti, piyasaların şeffaflığını engellemekte ve yatırımcıların piyasaya güvenini sarsmaktadır. İçeriden öğrenenler ticareti günümüzde birçok finansal piyasada yasaklanmış olmasına rağmen, yasaklanması veya serbest bırakılması konusunda literatürde halen görüş birliğine varılamamıştır. Menkul kıymet borsası bulunan ülke sayısındaki artışla birlikte, içeriden öğrenenler ticaretinin engellenmesine yönelik düzenlemede bulunan ülke sayısında da artış yaşanmıştır. Fakat bu ülkelerden yarısından daha azı, söz konusu düzenlemeleri uygulamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, içeriden öğrenenler ticaretini destekleyici ve yasaklayıcı yaklaşımlar incelenmiş olup; konu sosyolojik, ekonomik ve hukuki boyutlarıyla ele alınmıştır. Çalışmada, içeriden öğrenenler ticaretinin yatırımcılar başta olma üzere, piyasa oyuncularına sosyoekonomik etkilerinin test edilerek tartışılması gerektiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

APPROACHES TO INSIDER TRADING

Insider trading prevents transparency of the market and undermines the investors’ confidence. Although it is forbidden at many financial markets, it has not been decided whether to forbit or not. With the increasing number of countries which have stock exchange, there is an increasing number of countries that promulgate regulations. However, less than half of the countries apply regulations. In this study, prohibitive and supportive approaches to insider trading are reviewed and the topic is discussed with its sociologic, economic and judicial dimensions. The research concludes that socioeconomic impacts of insider trading to market, especially to investors, must be empirically tested.

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