Stok-akım uyarlaması, bütçe açığı ve kamu borç stoku arasındaki ilişkiler: Küresel kriz bağlamında Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler üzerine bir analiz

Stok-akım uyarlaması, belirli bir dönem için kamu borç stokundaki değişim ve bütçe açığı arasındaki farktır. Pozitif değere sahip stok-akım uyarlaması, kamu borç stokundaki artışın bütçe açığından daha yüksek olduğunu gösterirken, negatif stok- akım uyarlaması, kamu borç stokundaki artışın bütçe açığından daha düşük olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışma kapsamında, 2002-2008 dönemi için on beş Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülke için uygulanmış olan panel veri analizinde stok-akım uyarlamalarının bütçe açıkları ile negatif, kamu borç stokundaki artış ile pozitif korelasyon içinde bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bu sonuçlara göre üye ülkelerin bütçe açıklarını gizlemede bir yol olarak aslen kalıntı değer olarak kullanılan stok-akım uyarlamalarını, özellikle son küresel kriz döneminde, stratejik bir politika aracı olarak kullandıkları sonucuna varılmıştır.

The relations between stock-flow adjustment, budget deficit and public debt Stock: An analysis on European Union countries in the context of global crisis

The stock-flow adjustment is the difference between the change in government debt and the budget deficit for a given period. A stock-flow adjustment with a positive value indicates that the debt stock increases more than the budget deficit while a negative stock-flow adjustment indicates that the debt stock increases less than the budget deficit. Within the scope of this study, the results of the panel data analysis, employed for EU-fifteen countries, for the period 2002-2008 indicate that stock-flow adjustments and budget deficit are negatively correlated while stock-flow adjustments and debt stock are positively correlated. These results show that European countries use stock-flow adjustments, which are residual values in fact, as a strategic policy tool to hide their reported budget deficits, especially at the period of recent global crisis

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