Yasin Erdem ÇEVİK

Borsa İstanbul’da Mülkiyet ve Kontrol Yapıları

Çalışmanın temel amac ı, Türkiye'deki halka aç ık şirketlerin mülkiyet ve kontrol yapılarını ortaya koymaktır. Ağ analizi yoluyla nihai hakim ortaklar tespit edilmi ştir. Bulgular, Borsa İstanbul’un a ğırlıklı olarak ülkenin en zengin aileleri taraf ından yönetilen şirketlerden olu ştuğuna i şaret etmektedir. BIST-100 şirketlerinin yar ısından fazlasında (%51) kontrol yapıları kullanılmaktadır. En sık başvurulan kontrol mekanizmasının piramit yapıları (%34) oldu ğu görülmüştür. Haklar aras ındaki ayr ışma en fazla çoklu kontrol zinciri yoluyla ortaya ç ıkmaktadır. Çoklu pay grubunun uygulandığı şirket say ısı az (%16), nakit ak ış ve kontrol haklar ı ayrımına olan etkisi de sınırlıdır.

Ownership and Control Structures in Borsa Istanbul

The main purpose of the study is to reveal the ownership and control structures of listed firms in Turkey. Ultimate controlling shareholders were determined by network analysis. The findings indicate that Borsa Istanbul is predominantly composed of firms man aged by the richest families of the country. Control mechanisms (51%) are used in more than half of BIST-100 firms. It was observed that the most f requently used control mechanism was pyramid structures (34%).The separat ion between rights occurs at most through multiple control chains. Only few companies (16%) apply dual-class share structure, and its impact on the separation of cash flow and control rights is also limited.

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