İnanç Kontrolü ve Yönelimsellik
Bu yazıda, inancın iradî oluşunu [doxastik voluntarism] reddetmenin, karşı çıkanların yaptığı kadar kolay olmadığını savunacağım. William Alston’un, inancın iradî olamayacağı savunmasını eleştirel olarak ele alıp, ardından inancın niyet edilebilir [bir konu] olup olmadığı sorusu üzerinde duracağım.
Belief Control and Intentionality
Abstract (150-250 words) and keywords (5-7 keyword) in the input above
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