bilgi,yanılabilircilik ve zorunlu doğrular

Knowledge,fallibism and necessary truths

Infallibilism is the view that knewledge must entail the inconceivability of error. On this view, if you could have been wrong, you do not have knowledge. 'Contrary to this view, fallibilism claims, reasonably, that human knowledge is fallible. In line with this, virtually all contemporary epistemologists assume that we have knowledge even if we could have been mistaken. Despite this near unanimity, an adequate version of fallibilism has not yet been given. The standard versions are unable to account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. In this paper, I consider and refuse some attempts to deal with this difficulty and argue that we can resolve the problem by requiring that S's belief that/? could have been accidentally justified.

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