AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NDE MALİ VE PARASAL KURAL UYGULAMALARI

Avrupa’da yürürlükte olan sayısal malive parasalkurallar geçtiğimiz yirmi yıl boyunca sürekli olarak artışgöstermiştir. Öyle ki Avrupa’da hemen hemen her ülkede sayısal mali kuralların uygulandığı görülmektedir. Sayısal mali kurallar,yerel ya da bölgesel hükümet düzeylerinde uygulanma alanı bulmaktadır. Özellikle 1990’lı yıllarda Avrupa Birliğiüyesi ülkelerde, iradi maliye politikasının neden olduğu olumsuz sonuçları ortadan kaldırmak üzere kurallı maliye politikası önemli bir politika aracı haline gelmiştir.Avrupa’da kurallı maliye politikasının alt yapısı MaastrichtAntlaşması ve İstikrar ve Büyüme Paktıile güçlendirilmiştir. Buna ek olarak Avrupa’da işleyişsel (sürece ilişkin) ve sayısal mali kurallar olmak üzere iki tür mali kural uygulamaya koyulmuştur. Böylece,Avrupa Birliği’nde mali kurallar ile aşırı bütçe açıkları ve kamu borcunun önüne geçilerek mali disiplinin sağlanması amaçlanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği’nde mali kural uygulamalarının bir diğer önemli nedeni ise para ve maliye politikalarının uyum içerisinde sürdürülmesidir. Bu bağlamda,çalışmanın amacı Avrupa Birliği’nde uygulanan mali ve para kurallarını teorik açıdan analiz etmek;mali ve parasalkurallara ilişkinuygulamaların etkilerini ortaya koymaktır.

MONETARY and FISCAL RULES APPLICATIONS in EUROPEAN UNION

The numerical fiscaland monetaryrules in force in Europe have increased steadily over the past twenty years. It is observed that numerical fiscal rules are applied in almost every country in Europe. Numerical fiscal rules are appliedat local or regional government levels. Especially in the EU member countries in 1990s, fiscalhas found a regular fiscal policy application area in order to eliminate the negative results caused by discretionary fiscal policy. The infrastructure of the regular fiscal policy in Europe has been strengthened by the Maastrich Treaty and the stability and growth pact (SGP). In addition, two types of fiscal rules have been implemented in Europe: operational (process related) and numerical fiscal rules. Thus, it is aimed to prevent fiscal rules and excessive budget deficits and public debt in the European Union to ensure fiscal discipline. Another important reason for the implementation of fiscal rules in the European Union is that monetary and fiscal policies are maintained in harmony. In this context, the purpose of this study is to analyze the fiscal and monetary rules applied in the European Union theoretically and to reveal the effects of fiscal and monetary rules applications.

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