KADIN TEMSİLİ VE KAMU HARCAMASI

Bu çalışma, İsveç yerel meclislerindeki kadın temsili düzeyinin yerel kamu harcaması bileşimini etkileyip etkilemediğini tespit etmeye çalışıyor. Bu soruyu ampirik olarak ele almak adına, öncelikle seçimi kazanmış olan yerel meclis temsilcilerine uygulanan anket verilerini kullanarak; kadınlar ve erkekler arasında tercihler yönünden farklılaşma olup olmadığı analiz edilecektir. Bu öncül analiz, kadın temsilinin harcamalar üzerindeki etkisine dair kesin öngörülerde bulunmamıza olanak tanır. Müteakiben kamu harcaması bileşimi üzerinde yapılan panel veri analizi; kadınların yerel meclislerde artan temsilinin; yaşlı bakımına nazaran çocuk bakımı ve eğitim harcamalarında artırıcı etki yapacağı yönündeki tahminlemeleri destekleyici sonuçlar verir

WOMEN REPRESENTATIVE AND PUBLIC EXCLUSION

This paper studies whether the degree of women’s representation in Swedish local councils affects local public expenditure patterns. To empirically address this question, I first analyze the differences in preferences between men and women expressed by elected local council representatives using survey data. This enables me to make precise predictions about the effects of women’s representation on spending. The subsequent panel study on the composition of public spending supports the predictions that increased representation of women in the local council increases spending on childcare and education relative to elderly care.

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