İtalya, 1911-1912 Trablusgarp Harbi’nin ardından Osmanlı meseleleriyle daha yakından alakalı olmuştur. Londra Antlaşması’yla İtalya’nın Birinci Dünya Harbi’ne katılması, Anadolu ve Doğu Akdeniz üzerinde bir İtalyan nüfuz alanı kurma hayalini cesaretlendirmiştir. Bir İtalyan topluluğuna da ev sahipliği yapan İzmir liman şehri, St Jean de Maurienne Antlaşması yoluyla İtalyan iddialarının Britanya ve Fransa tarafından tanınmasını sağlamak için başarılı bir şekilde mücadele eden İtalyan diplomasisinin açık hedefiydi. Bu makalenin amacı, özellikle 15 Mayıs 1919’da Yunanların liderliğinde İzmir’in İtilaf Devletler’ce işgaliyle sonuçlanan ve İtalyanların Anadolu planlarının başarısızlığının başlangıcı olan siyasi olaylara odaklanarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun parçalanmasında İtalya’nın rolü hakkında güncellenmiş tarihsel bir tablo sunmaktır. Çalışmada İtalyan diplomatik kaynaklardan yararlanarak hem İtalya yayılmacı projeleri kapsamında İzmir’in yeri hem de İtalyan yöneticilerin işgal algıları değerlendirilecektir.

This essay aims to offer an updated historical account of the Italian involvement in the partition of the Ottoman Empire focusing specifically on the events which led to the 15 May 1919 Greek-led interallied occupation of İzmir and the beginning of the failure of the Italian claims in Anatolia. Through the reading of the Italian diplomatic sources as well as existing historiography on the subject, the essay attempts to evaluate the position of Izmir in the Italian expansionist plans and to reconstruct the Italian leading cadre’s perception of the occupation of the city. After the end of the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912, Italy became more directly involved in the Ottoman affairs. The Italian intervention in the Great War following the signature of the London Pact encouraged the dream of extending the country’s influence over Eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia. However, the treaty was extremely vague as regards to Italian future territorial gains. As the rumors about the Sykes-Picot Treaty reached Italian authorities, a more incisive diplomatic action supporting Italian expansionism took place. Moreover, between 1916 and 1917 emerged a broad movement of public opinion, which included liberals, conservative as well as nationalist writers, calling for a ‘minimum program’ of colonial claims in the Balkans, in Africa and Anatolia as well. In this light the so called ‘Franchetti memorandum’, signed by prominent intellectuals and civil servants, demanded the establishment of a direct rule on all the port-cities in Southern and Western Anatolia, including İzmir, which hosted a relevant Italian community. During the hard negotiations led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne on 26th April 1917, Italy obtained the recognition of its claims on Antalya, Konya and İzmir by Great Britain and France on the condition of Russian approval. Significantly, after the October Revolution and Russian withdrawal from the conflict and the end of the war, the Entente refused to recognize the Italian claims. At the same time, the British plan to assign the administration of İzmir to Greece, which struggled for the realization of the ‘Megali Idea’ (Great Idea), provoked a deep resentment and the reorientation of Italian policy toward the Ottomans. In other words, when it was clear that the Entente Powers would not support its colonial claims in Anatolia, Italy started a more pro-Turkish policy which aimed to counter the Greek claims on western Anatolia. The new Italian Fulvio BERTUCCELLI 24 ÇTTAD, XXIII/46, (2023/Bahar) attitude aimed to legitimize Italy as an ‘impartial’ power, rather than a colonial one, willing to protect Muslims’ interests against the Greek ambitions. The occupation of Antalya on 28th March 1919 without getting the approval of the other Entente powers must be seen in the framework of this independent policy. However, this Italian unilateral step, along with the controversies regarding the future of Fiume/Rijeka, led to a downturn in the relation with the allies and to the retirement of Italy from the Paris Peace Conference on 24th April 1919. Retrospectively it is indeed clear that the Italian invasion of Antalya faced the country with the danger of diplomatic isolation and had no other result than that of speeding-up the British-backed Greek plan to gain the control of İzmir. After the return of the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference, Italy had no choice than to reluctantly endorse the decision to allow the Greek-led interallied occupation of İzmir on 15th May 1919. Although the Greek occupation of the city involved a loss of prestige of Italy in the eyes of Ottoman public opinion, in the framework of the Greek- Italian propaganda war the Italian authorities carefully documented the Greek atrocities against the city’s Muslim population. However, the resignation of the cabinet led by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, which led to that of Sidney Sonnino from the office of Minister Foreign Affairs, opened an even more difficult stage in the relations between Italy and the other victorious powers. The aggressive declarations by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tommaso Tittoni, who stated that Italy was going to follow an uncompromising policy provoked a harsh reaction by the United States, Great Britain and France whose representatives issued a memorandum which strongly condemned Italy’s unilateral attitude. Faced once again with the concrete danger of international isolation, Tittoni, reached an agreement with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos which contradicted the policy Italy had followed so far. Even if the so-called Tittoni-Venizelos agreement did not stop the ongoing propaganda activities against Greece, it showed the inconsistency of the Italian colonial claims in Anatolia. In other words, Italy remained posed between expansionist ambitions and the lack of military and financial resources to realize them.