Yönelimsel Duruş, Tasarım Duruşu ve Fiziksel Duruş

Dennett’e göre, Fiziksel Duruş, nesnenin fiziki öğeleri, Tasarım Duruşu nesnenin tasarım ayrıntıları cinsi üzerinden bir açıklama yapar. Yönelimsel Duruş ise, öncekilerden bağımsız olarak, nesneye atfedilen yönelimsel haller cinsinden nesnenin davranışını açıklar. Nesneye atfedilen yönelimsel haller ise sadece pragmatik gerekçelere dayanır, metafizik bağlayıcılıkları yoktur. Zihinsel hallerin gerçeklikleri yoktur; meridyen, paralel ve sayı kavramlarında olduğu gibi olumsal dünyada herhangi bir şeye bir gönderimde bulunmazlar. Dennett’in zihinsel hallerin gerçekliğini reddiyesinin başlıca nedeni ise onun orijinal yönelimsellik-türetilmiş yönelimsellik ayrımına karşı çıkmasından kaynaklanır. Bu makalenin ilk bölümünde, Dennett’in meşhur üç açıklama yöntemini açıklayacağım. İkinci bölümde, Dennett’in orijinal yönelimsellik türünü neden reddettiğini açıklayacağım ve bu reddiyeyi desteklemek için kullandığı örneklerin hiçbirinin onun amacına hizmet etmediğini savunacağım. Sonuç bölümünde ise, Dennett’in iddiasındaki iki temel zayıf noktaya işaret edeceğim.

Intentional Stance, Design Stance and Physical Stance

According to Dennett, The Physical Stance explains objects in terms of their physical elements, while the Design Stance explains objects through the analysis of their design features. The Intentional Stance, independent of the former stances, explains the behavior of the object in terms of the intentional states attributed to that object. Intentional states that are ascribed to the object depend only on pragmatic grounds; a metaphysical commitment to their existence is out of the question. For Dennett, mental states are not real; just like in the concept of longitude, latitude and number, they do not refer to anything in the contingent world. The main reason for Dennnett’s denial of the reality of mental states is based on his challenge to the distinction between original and derived intentionality. In the first section of this essay, I will explain Dennett’s three widely-known explanatory frameworks. In the second section, I will explain Dennett’s reason for the refusal of original intentionality and I will argue for the claim that none of the examples he provided to support his refusal actually supports his refusal. In the conclusion section, I will point out two essential weak spots in Dennett’s claim.

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