Norton-Brown Tartışması Bağlamında Bilimsel Düşünce Deneyleri

Düşünce deneylerini gerçekleştirdiğimizde sonucunda elde edilen bilgininnereden geldiği sorusu düşünce deneylerinin epistemolojik konumuna ilişkintartışılan en temel konulardan bir tanesidir. Bu doğrultuda, Pierre Duhem düşünce deneylerinin gerçek deneyler ile aynı statüde değerlendirilemeyeceğini vehatta düşünce deneylerinin gerçek deneylerin bir alternatifi olarak bile kabuledilemeyeceğini belirterek konuya ilişkin şüpheci bir tavır sergilemektedir. James R. Brown ise yeni deneysel kanıtlara dayanmayan ya da eski verilerdenmantıksal olarak türetilmeyen, Platoncu düşünce deneyi olarak adlandırılan düşünce deneylerinin a priori bilgiye sezgisel erişim sağladığını ifade etmektedir.Brown’ın aksine, John D. Norton düşünce deneylerinin fiziksel dünyanın bilgisine gizemli bir erişim sağladığı yönündeki düşünceyi kesin bir dille eleştirmekte ve düşünce deneylerinin ampirizmi aşan bir bilgi sağlamasının mümkün olamayacağını ifade etmektedir. Norton-Brown tartışması çerçevesinde bu makalede, Brown'un düşünce deneylerine ilişkin tutumu, konuyla ilgili düşüncelerineleştirel olarak analiz edilmesiyle desteklenmektedir.

Scientific Thought Experiments in the Context of the Norton-Brown Debate

The question of where the knowledge comes from when we conduct thought experiments has been one of the most fundamental issues discussed in the epistemological position of thought experiments. In this regard, Pierre Du-hem shows a skeptical attitude on the subject by stating that thought experi-ments cannot be evaluated as real experiments or cannot be accepted as an al-ternative to real experiments. James R. Brown, on the other hand, states that thought experiments, which are not based on new experimental evidence or logically derived from old data, called the Platonic thought experiment, provide intuitive access to a priori knowledge. Unlike Brown, John D. Norton strictly criticizes the idea that thought experiments provide mysterious access to the knowledge of the physical world, and states that thought experiments cannot provide knowledge that transcends empiricism. In the context of the Norton-Brown debate, in this article, Brown's stance on thought experiments is sup-ported by critically analyzing the thoughts put forward on the subject.

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